Automated analysis of weighted voting games

Fatima, Shaheen, Wooldridge, Michael and Jennings, Nick (2011) Automated analysis of weighted voting games. In, Proc. 13th Int. Conf. on Electronic Commerce, Liverpool, UK,


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Weighted voting games (WVGs) are an important mechanism for modeling scenarios where a group of agents must reach agreement on some issue over which they have different preferences. However, for such games to be effective, they must be well designed. Thus, a key concern for a mechanism designer is to structure games so that they have certain desirable properties. In this context, two such properties are PROPER and STRONG. A game is PROPER if for every coalition that is winning, its complement is not. A game is STRONG if for every coalition that is losing, its complement is not. In most cases, a mechanism designer wants games that are both PROPER and STRONG. To this end, we first show that the problem of determining whether a game is PROPER or STRONG is, in general, NP-hard. Then we determine those conditions (that can be evaluated in polynomial time) under which a given WVG is PROPER and those under which it is STRONG. Finally, for the general NP-hard case, we discuss two different approaches for overcoming the complexity: a deterministic approximation scheme and a randomized approximation method.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Divisions : Faculty of Physical Sciences and Engineering > Electronics and Computer Science > Agents, Interactions & Complexity
ePrint ID: 272742
Accepted Date and Publication Date:
Date Deposited: 02 Sep 2011 12:43
Last Modified: 31 Mar 2016 14:21
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