Leadership and self-enforcing international environmental agreements with non-negative emissions


Rubio, S. and Ulph, A. (2002) Leadership and self-enforcing international environmental agreements with non-negative emissions. Southampton, University of Southampton (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 0211).

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Description/Abstract

For the widely-used linear-quadratic model of stable IEAs the key results are: (i) if the members of the IEA act in a Cournot fashion with respect to non-signatories, a stable IEA has no more than 2 signatories; (ii) if the signatories act as Stackelberg leaders, a stable IEA can have any number of signatories. These results were derived using numerical simulations and ignored the non-negativity constraint on emissions. Recent papers using analytical approaches and explicitly recognising the non-negativity constraint have suggested that with Stackelberg leadership a stable IEA has at most four signatories. Such papers have introduced non-negativity constraints by restricting parameter values to ensure interior solutions for emissions, which restricts the number of signatories. We use the more appropriate approach of directly imposing the non-negativity constraint on emissions, recognising that for some parameter values this will entail corner solutions, and show, analytically, that the key results from the literature go through.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Related URLs:
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
J Political Science > JZ International relations
G Geography. Anthropology. Recreation > GE Environmental Sciences
Divisions: University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
ePrint ID: 33382
Date Deposited: 18 May 2006
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2014 18:20
Publisher: University of Southampton
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33382

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