Social welfare in one-sided matching mechanisms
Social welfare in one-sided matching mechanisms
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated. We present a general lower bound of Ω (√n) on the Price of Anarchy, which applies to all mechanisms. We show that two well-known mechanisms, Probabilistic Serial, and Random Priority, achieve a matching upper bound. We extend our lower bound to the Price of Stability of a large class of mechanisms that satisfy a common proportionality property, and show stronger bounds on the Price of Anarchy of all deterministic mechanisms.
30-50
Christodoulou, George
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Filos-Ratsikas, Aris
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Frederiksen, Soren Kristoffer Stiil
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Goldberg, Paul W.
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Zhang, Jie
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Zhang, Jinshan
dceaf1fe-451c-4cdd-87d8-1ed661bf468e
Christodoulou, George
a6890185-8c0b-4b9d-9cc3-61310576a751
Filos-Ratsikas, Aris
14e554b2-bc6b-4b2c-a84d-8650ad4bed14
Frederiksen, Soren Kristoffer Stiil
3e896a21-0be0-4102-895d-2370e32c28ae
Goldberg, Paul W.
46b110bb-a7df-406d-babc-291a17fff863
Zhang, Jie
6bad4e75-40e0-4ea3-866d-58c8018b225a
Zhang, Jinshan
dceaf1fe-451c-4cdd-87d8-1ed661bf468e
Christodoulou, George, Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, Frederiksen, Soren Kristoffer Stiil, Goldberg, Paul W., Zhang, Jie and Zhang, Jinshan
(2016)
Social welfare in one-sided matching mechanisms.
Osman, N. and Sierra, C.
(eds.)
In Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: Proceeding of the AAMAS 2016.
Springer Cham.
.
(doi:10.1007/978-3-319-46882-2_3).
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated. We present a general lower bound of Ω (√n) on the Price of Anarchy, which applies to all mechanisms. We show that two well-known mechanisms, Probabilistic Serial, and Random Priority, achieve a matching upper bound. We extend our lower bound to the Price of Stability of a large class of mechanisms that satisfy a common proportionality property, and show stronger bounds on the Price of Anarchy of all deterministic mechanisms.
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Matching AAMAS camera ready
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e-pub ahead of print date: 24 September 2016
Additional Information:
© 2016 Springer International Publishing AG
Venue - Dates:
2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems (AAMAS '16), , Singapore, Singapore, 2016-05-09 - 2016-05-13
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 402577
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/402577
PURE UUID: b5f95ce2-0ee6-41d1-8e8f-b75006d406f0
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Date deposited: 29 Nov 2016 09:29
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 22:14
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Contributors
Author:
George Christodoulou
Author:
Aris Filos-Ratsikas
Author:
Soren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen
Author:
Paul W. Goldberg
Author:
Jie Zhang
Author:
Jinshan Zhang
Editor:
N. Osman
Editor:
C. Sierra
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