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Combinatorial Markets for Efficient Electricity Management

Combinatorial Markets for Efficient Electricity Management
Combinatorial Markets for Efficient Electricity Management
The deregulation of the electricity industry in many countries has created a number of marketplaces in which producers and consumers can operate in order to more effectively manage and meet their energy needs. To this end, this paper develops a new model for electricity retail where end-use customers choose their supplier from competing electricity retailers. The model is based on similtaneous reverse combinatorial auctions, designed as a second-price sealed-bid multi-item auction with supply function bidding. This model prevents strategic bidding and allows the auctioneer to maximise its payoff. Furthermore, we develop optimal single-item and multi-item algorithms for winner determination in such auctions that are significantly less complex than those currently available in the literature.
626-632
Penya, Y.K.
57659273-9acf-42ff-8667-9f8ff5aff22d
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Penya, Y.K.
57659273-9acf-42ff-8667-9f8ff5aff22d
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30

Penya, Y.K. and Jennings, N. R. (2005) Combinatorial Markets for Efficient Electricity Management. International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, France. pp. 626-632 .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

The deregulation of the electricity industry in many countries has created a number of marketplaces in which producers and consumers can operate in order to more effectively manage and meet their energy needs. To this end, this paper develops a new model for electricity retail where end-use customers choose their supplier from competing electricity retailers. The model is based on similtaneous reverse combinatorial auctions, designed as a second-price sealed-bid multi-item auction with supply function bidding. This model prevents strategic bidding and allows the auctioneer to maximise its payoff. Furthermore, we develop optimal single-item and multi-item algorithms for winner determination in such auctions that are significantly less complex than those currently available in the literature.

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Published date: 2005
Venue - Dates: International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, France, 2005-01-01
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 261138
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/261138
PURE UUID: 483bfe15-f2f1-4329-86f6-62d8a6b51c86

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Date deposited: 10 Aug 2005
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 09:05

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