Multi-Issue Negotiation Processes by Evolutionary Computation, Validation and Social Extensions
Multi-Issue Negotiation Processes by Evolutionary Computation, Validation and Social Extensions
e describe a system for bilateral negotiations in which artificial agents are generated by an evolutionary algorithm (EA). The negotiations are governed by a finite-horizon version of the alternating-offers protocol. Several issues are negotiated simultaneously. We first analyse and validate the outcomes of the evolutionary system, using the game-theoretic subgame-perfect equilibrium as a benchmark. We then present two extensions of the negotiation model. In the first extension agents take into account the fairness of the obtained payoff. We find that when the fairness norm is consistently applied during the negotiation, agents reach symmetric outcomes which are robust and rather insensitive to the actual fairness settings. In the second extension we model a competitive market situation where agents have multiple bargaining opportunities before reaching the final agreement. Symmetric outcomes are now also obtained, even when the number of bargaining opportunities is small. We furthermore study the influence of search or negotiation costs in this game.
multi-issue bargaining, evolutionary algorithms, fairness, multiple bargaining opportunities
39-63
Gerding, E. H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
van Bragt, D. D. B.
09cafaca-95d5-4073-b64e-c66a6a2cbd90
La Poutre, J. A.
275c5cb4-c376-4b65-b4d9-7574fb5532ab
August 2003
Gerding, E. H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
van Bragt, D. D. B.
09cafaca-95d5-4073-b64e-c66a6a2cbd90
La Poutre, J. A.
275c5cb4-c376-4b65-b4d9-7574fb5532ab
Gerding, E. H., van Bragt, D. D. B. and La Poutre, J. A.
(2003)
Multi-Issue Negotiation Processes by Evolutionary Computation, Validation and Social Extensions.
Computational Economics, 22 (1), .
Abstract
e describe a system for bilateral negotiations in which artificial agents are generated by an evolutionary algorithm (EA). The negotiations are governed by a finite-horizon version of the alternating-offers protocol. Several issues are negotiated simultaneously. We first analyse and validate the outcomes of the evolutionary system, using the game-theoretic subgame-perfect equilibrium as a benchmark. We then present two extensions of the negotiation model. In the first extension agents take into account the fairness of the obtained payoff. We find that when the fairness norm is consistently applied during the negotiation, agents reach symmetric outcomes which are robust and rather insensitive to the actual fairness settings. In the second extension we model a competitive market situation where agents have multiple bargaining opportunities before reaching the final agreement. Symmetric outcomes are now also obtained, even when the number of bargaining opportunities is small. We furthermore study the influence of search or negotiation costs in this game.
More information
Published date: August 2003
Keywords:
multi-issue bargaining, evolutionary algorithms, fairness, multiple bargaining opportunities
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity, Electronics & Computer Science
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 263274
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/263274
PURE UUID: 0d5d8fb5-28fb-4950-bb1b-9849405a693d
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Date deposited: 22 Dec 2006
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:23
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Contributors
Author:
E. H. Gerding
Author:
D. D. B. van Bragt
Author:
J. A. La Poutre
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