True Costs of Cheap Labor Are Hard To Measure: Edge Deletion and VCG Payments in Graphs
True Costs of Cheap Labor Are Hard To Measure: Edge Deletion and VCG Payments in Graphs
 
  We address the problem of lowering the buyer's expected payments in shortest path auctions, where the buyer's goal is to purchase a path in a graph in which edges are owned by selfish agents. We show that by deleting some of the edges of the graph, one can reduce the total payment of the VCG mechanism by a factor of $\Theta(n)$. However, we prove that it is NP-hard to find the best subset of edges to delete, even if the edge costs are small integers, or the graph has very simple structure; in the former case, this problem is hard to approximate, too. On the positive side, we describe a pseudopolynomial time algorithm for series-parallel graphs and fixed edge costs. Also, we discuss the applicability of this algorithm for the case of general (probabilistic) costs and derive a general lower bound on the performance of algorithms that are based on expected edge costs.
  108-116
  
    
      Elkind, Edith
      
        7a013473-5cd0-4e41-b907-66b30a04a400
      
     
  
  
    
      Riedl, John
      
        21aae74d-fcdf-432d-9d43-d86fc11b7c43
      
     
  
    
      Kearns, Michael J.
      
        34739b48-dc6a-4a3a-b3c8-7ff2b18dab21
      
     
  
    
      Reiter, Michael K.
      
        c8ed2f4e-85c3-4cf0-aa7b-027f76123e8a
      
     
  
   
  
  
    
      2005
    
    
  
  
    
      Elkind, Edith
      
        7a013473-5cd0-4e41-b907-66b30a04a400
      
     
  
    
      Riedl, John
      
        21aae74d-fcdf-432d-9d43-d86fc11b7c43
      
     
  
    
      Kearns, Michael J.
      
        34739b48-dc6a-4a3a-b3c8-7ff2b18dab21
      
     
  
    
      Reiter, Michael K.
      
        c8ed2f4e-85c3-4cf0-aa7b-027f76123e8a
      
     
  
       
    
 
  
    
      
  
  
  
  
    Elkind, Edith
  
  
  
  
   
    (2005)
  
  
    
    True Costs of Cheap Labor Are Hard To Measure: Edge Deletion and VCG Payments in Graphs.
  
  
  
    
      Riedl, John, Kearns, Michael J. and Reiter, Michael K. 
      (eds.)
    
  
  
    
    
    
      
        
   
  
    6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2005), Vancouver, Canada.
   
        
        
        05 - 08  Jun 2005.
      
    
  
  
  
      
          
          
        .
    
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
    
      Record type:
      Conference or Workshop Item
      (Paper)
      
      
    
   
    
    
      
        
          Abstract
          We address the problem of lowering the buyer's expected payments in shortest path auctions, where the buyer's goal is to purchase a path in a graph in which edges are owned by selfish agents. We show that by deleting some of the edges of the graph, one can reduce the total payment of the VCG mechanism by a factor of $\Theta(n)$. However, we prove that it is NP-hard to find the best subset of edges to delete, even if the edge costs are small integers, or the graph has very simple structure; in the former case, this problem is hard to approximate, too. On the positive side, we describe a pseudopolynomial time algorithm for series-parallel graphs and fixed edge costs. Also, we discuss the applicability of this algorithm for the case of general (probabilistic) costs and derive a general lower bound on the performance of algorithms that are based on expected edge costs.
         
      
      
    
   
  
  
  More information
  
    
      Published date: 2005
 
    
  
  
    
  
    
     
        Additional Information:
        Event Dates: June 5-8, 2005
      
    
  
    
     
        Venue - Dates:
        6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2005), Vancouver, Canada, 2005-06-05 - 2005-06-08
      
    
  
    
  
    
  
    
  
    
     
        Organisations:
        Electronics & Computer Science
      
    
  
    
  
  
        Identifiers
        Local EPrints ID: 263440
        URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/263440
        
        
        
        
          PURE UUID: 4ffbee57-ade3-43bc-b094-8d8b581233d5
        
  
    
        
          
        
    
        
          
        
    
        
          
        
    
        
          
        
    
  
  Catalogue record
  Date deposited: 15 Feb 2007
  Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 07:31
  Export record
  
  
 
 
  
    
    
      Contributors
      
          
          Author:
          
            
            
              Edith Elkind
            
          
        
      
          
          Editor:
          
            
            
              John Riedl
            
          
        
      
          
          Editor:
          
            
            
              Michael J. Kearns
            
          
        
      
          
          Editor:
          
            
            
              Michael K. Reiter
            
          
        
      
      
      
    
  
   
  
    Download statistics
    
      Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
      
      View more statistics