Analysing buyers' and sellers' strategic interactions in marketplaces: an evolutionary game theoretic approach.
Analysing buyers' and sellers' strategic interactions in marketplaces: an evolutionary game theoretic approach.
We develop a new model to analyse the strategic behaviour of buyers and sellers in market mechanisms. In particular, we wish to understand how the different strategies they adopt affect their economic efficiency in the market and to understand the impact of these choices on the overall efficiency of the marketplace. To this end, we adopt a two-population evolutionary game theoretic approach, where we consider how the behaviours of both buyers and sellers evolve in marketplaces. In so doing, we address the shortcomings of the previous state-of-the-art analytical model that assumes that buyers and sellers have to adopt the same mixed strategy in the market. Finally, we apply our model in one of the most common market mechanisms, the Continuous Double Auction, and demonstrate how it allows us to provide new insights into the strategic interactions of such trading agents.
141-154
Vytelingum, P.
418675f3-cbda-47bc-8336-474fe328ac99
Cliff, D
28ba983e-e754-4918-b5bf-cfa88d4550da
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
2007
Vytelingum, P.
418675f3-cbda-47bc-8336-474fe328ac99
Cliff, D
28ba983e-e754-4918-b5bf-cfa88d4550da
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Vytelingum, P., Cliff, D and Jennings, N. R.
(2007)
Analysing buyers' and sellers' strategic interactions in marketplaces: an evolutionary game theoretic approach.
9th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce., Hawaii., United States.
.
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
We develop a new model to analyse the strategic behaviour of buyers and sellers in market mechanisms. In particular, we wish to understand how the different strategies they adopt affect their economic efficiency in the market and to understand the impact of these choices on the overall efficiency of the marketplace. To this end, we adopt a two-population evolutionary game theoretic approach, where we consider how the behaviours of both buyers and sellers evolve in marketplaces. In so doing, we address the shortcomings of the previous state-of-the-art analytical model that assumes that buyers and sellers have to adopt the same mixed strategy in the market. Finally, we apply our model in one of the most common market mechanisms, the Continuous Double Auction, and demonstrate how it allows us to provide new insights into the strategic interactions of such trading agents.
Text
AMEC07-pv.pdf
- Other
More information
Published date: 2007
Venue - Dates:
9th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce., Hawaii., United States, 2007-01-01
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 264228
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/264228
PURE UUID: 36c54750-af97-4641-bdea-8143b2600e94
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 22 Jun 2007
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 07:44
Export record
Contributors
Author:
P. Vytelingum
Author:
D Cliff
Author:
N. R. Jennings
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics