Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions
Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions
We study sequential auctions for private value objects and unit-demand bidders using second-price sealed-bid rules. We analyze this scenario from the seller's perspective and consider several approaches to increasing the total revenue. We derive the equilibrium bidding strategies for each individual auction. We then study the problem of selecting an optimal agenda, i.e., a revenue-maximizing ordering of the auctions. We describe an efficient algorithm that finds an optimal agenda in the important special case when the revenue of each auction is guaranteed to be strictly positive. We also show that the seller can increase his revenue by canceling one or more auctions, even if the number of bidders exceeds the number of objects for sale, and analyze the bidders' behavior and the seller's profit for different cancellation rules.
Elkind, Edith
7a013473-5cd0-4e41-b907-66b30a04a400
Fatima, Shaheen
34eb181a-62b1-4824-8284-f37cd875064f
2007
Elkind, Edith
7a013473-5cd0-4e41-b907-66b30a04a400
Fatima, Shaheen
34eb181a-62b1-4824-8284-f37cd875064f
Elkind, Edith and Fatima, Shaheen
(2007)
Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions.
The 3rd International Workshop On Internet And Network Economics (WINE 2007), San Diego, California, United States.
12 - 14 Dec 2007.
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Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
We study sequential auctions for private value objects and unit-demand bidders using second-price sealed-bid rules. We analyze this scenario from the seller's perspective and consider several approaches to increasing the total revenue. We derive the equilibrium bidding strategies for each individual auction. We then study the problem of selecting an optimal agenda, i.e., a revenue-maximizing ordering of the auctions. We describe an efficient algorithm that finds an optimal agenda in the important special case when the revenue of each auction is guaranteed to be strictly positive. We also show that the seller can increase his revenue by canceling one or more auctions, even if the number of bidders exceeds the number of objects for sale, and analyze the bidders' behavior and the seller's profit for different cancellation rules.
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Published date: 2007
Additional Information:
Event Dates: December 12--14, 2007
Venue - Dates:
The 3rd International Workshop On Internet And Network Economics (WINE 2007), San Diego, California, United States, 2007-12-12 - 2007-12-14
Organisations:
Electronics & Computer Science
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 264427
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/264427
PURE UUID: 524b908e-84cc-4ba6-9cec-11b05348926b
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Date deposited: 22 Aug 2007
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 07:50
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Contributors
Author:
Edith Elkind
Author:
Shaheen Fatima
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