Congestion games with load-dependent failures: identical resources

Penn, Michal, Polukarov, Maria and Tennenholtz, Moshe (2009) Congestion games with load-dependent failures: identical resources [in special issue: Special Section of Games and Economic Behavior Dedicated to the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce] Games and Economic Behavior, 67, (1), pp. 156-173. (doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.004).


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We define a new class of games---congestion games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs). In a CGLF each player can choose a subset of a set of available resources in order to try and perform his task. We assume that the resources are identical but that players' benefits from successful completion of their tasks may differ. Each resource is associated with a cost of use and failure probability which are load-dependent. Although CGLFs in general do not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every CGLF with nondecreasing cost functions. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.004
ISSNs: 0899-8256 (print)
Keywords: congestion games, load-dependent resource failures, pure strategy nash equilibrium, algorithms
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity
ePrint ID: 267882
Date :
Date Event
September 2009Published
Date Deposited: 16 Sep 2009 19:59
Last Modified: 17 Apr 2017 18:40
Further Information:Google Scholar

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