Automated analysis of weighted voting games
Automated analysis of weighted voting games
Weighted voting games (WVGs) are an important mechanism for modeling scenarios where a group of agents must reach agreement on some issue over which they have different preferences. However, for such games to be effective, they must be well designed. Thus, a key concern for a mechanism designer is to structure games so that they have certain desirable properties. In this context, two such properties are PROPER and STRONG. A game is PROPER if for every coalition that is winning, its complement is not. A game is STRONG if for every coalition that is losing, its complement is not. In most cases, a mechanism designer wants games that are both PROPER and STRONG. To this end, we first show that the problem of determining whether a game is PROPER or STRONG is, in general, NP-hard. Then we determine those conditions (that can be evaluated in polynomial time) under which a given WVG is PROPER and those under which it is STRONG. Finally, for the general NP-hard case, we discuss two different approaches for overcoming the complexity: a deterministic approximation scheme and a randomized approximation method.
Fatima, Shaheen
34eb181a-62b1-4824-8284-f37cd875064f
Wooldridge, Michael
94674704-0392-4b93-83db-18198c2cfa3b
Jennings, Nick
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
2011
Fatima, Shaheen
34eb181a-62b1-4824-8284-f37cd875064f
Wooldridge, Michael
94674704-0392-4b93-83db-18198c2cfa3b
Jennings, Nick
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Fatima, Shaheen, Wooldridge, Michael and Jennings, Nick
(2011)
Automated analysis of weighted voting games.
Proc. 13th Int. Conf. on Electronic Commerce, Liverpool, United Kingdom.
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
Weighted voting games (WVGs) are an important mechanism for modeling scenarios where a group of agents must reach agreement on some issue over which they have different preferences. However, for such games to be effective, they must be well designed. Thus, a key concern for a mechanism designer is to structure games so that they have certain desirable properties. In this context, two such properties are PROPER and STRONG. A game is PROPER if for every coalition that is winning, its complement is not. A game is STRONG if for every coalition that is losing, its complement is not. In most cases, a mechanism designer wants games that are both PROPER and STRONG. To this end, we first show that the problem of determining whether a game is PROPER or STRONG is, in general, NP-hard. Then we determine those conditions (that can be evaluated in polynomial time) under which a given WVG is PROPER and those under which it is STRONG. Finally, for the general NP-hard case, we discuss two different approaches for overcoming the complexity: a deterministic approximation scheme and a randomized approximation method.
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Published date: 2011
Venue - Dates:
Proc. 13th Int. Conf. on Electronic Commerce, Liverpool, United Kingdom, 2011-01-01
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 272742
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/272742
PURE UUID: a3432fda-3202-4d1c-adfe-b48199d443ea
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Date deposited: 02 Sep 2011 12:43
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 10:08
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Contributors
Author:
Shaheen Fatima
Author:
Michael Wooldridge
Author:
Nick Jennings
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