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Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs?

Record type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)

The paper examines the current debate on the real effectiveness of delegation in overcoming the problem of time inconsistency that afflicts discretionary monetary policy. An important contribution by Jensen has shown that, when the government is unable to credibly carry out optimal policy and delegates monetary policy to a central banker with an announced incentive scheme, optimal policy can be credible only if reappointment costs are prohibitive. This finding is questioned in the present analysis. In particular we show that, when delegation is not considered as an alternative, but rather as supplementary, to reputation and is conducive to reputation building for the central banker, the circumstances under which optimal delegation can be credible need not be so extreme. This different result is based on the constraint that the central banker's reputation for low inflation imposes on the government's temptation to deviate from its announcements and on the role played by incentive schemes in strengthening the central banker's reputation.

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Citation

Rotondi, Zeno (2000) Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs? , Southampton, UK University of Southampton 33pp. (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 3).

More information

Published date: 2000
Keywords: delegation, reappointment, in‡ationary bias

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 33108
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33108
PURE UUID: 098dc6a9-3247-421c-80b3-34d4d2cef53f

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 19 Jul 2006
Last modified: 17 Jul 2017 15:54

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Contributors

Author: Zeno Rotondi

University divisions


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