Preferential opponent selection in public goods games
Preferential opponent selection in public goods games
This paper discusses preferential opponent selection in public goods games. It is shown that a preference to play with successful opponents strongly enhances the prevalence of cooperation. The finding is robust on spatial grids and heterogeneous networks. Importantly, I also demonstrate that positive opponent selection biases can evolve and become dominant in initially randomly mixed populations without selection bias.
Brede, Markus
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7
October 2012
Brede, Markus
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7
Brede, Markus
(2012)
Preferential opponent selection in public goods games.
Advances in Complex Systems, 15 (7).
Abstract
This paper discusses preferential opponent selection in public goods games. It is shown that a preference to play with successful opponents strongly enhances the prevalence of cooperation. The finding is robust on spatial grids and heterogeneous networks. Importantly, I also demonstrate that positive opponent selection biases can evolve and become dominant in initially randomly mixed populations without selection bias.
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Published date: October 2012
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
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Local EPrints ID: 346844
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/346844
ISSN: 0219-5259
PURE UUID: 3ed56b27-f786-4d5d-942c-86d013e54f8a
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Date deposited: 09 Jan 2013 15:37
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 12:42
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Author:
Markus Brede
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