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Lending decisions with limits on capital available: the polygamous marriage problem

Lending decisions with limits on capital available: the polygamous marriage problem
Lending decisions with limits on capital available: the polygamous marriage problem
In order to stimulate or subdue the economy, banking regulators have sought to impose caps or floors on individual bank's lending to certain types of borrowers. This paper shows that the resultant decision problem for a bank of which potential borrower to accept is a variant of the marriage/secretary problem where one can accept several applicants. The paper solves the decision problem using dynamic programming. We give results on the form of the optimal lending problem and counter examples to further “reasonable” conjectures which do not hold in the general case. By solving numerical examples we show the potential loss of profit and the inconsistency in the lending decision that are caused by introducing floors and caps on lending. The paper also describes some other situations where the same decision occurs.
dynamic programming, markov processes, consumer credit lending
0377-2217
407-416
So, M.C.
c6922ccf-547b-485e-8b74-a9271e6225a2
Thomas, L.C.
a3ce3068-328b-4bce-889f-965b0b9d2362
Huang, B.
1da4edaf-e0b9-403a-b200-27ca5a207c08
So, M.C.
c6922ccf-547b-485e-8b74-a9271e6225a2
Thomas, L.C.
a3ce3068-328b-4bce-889f-965b0b9d2362
Huang, B.
1da4edaf-e0b9-403a-b200-27ca5a207c08

So, M.C., Thomas, L.C. and Huang, B. (2016) Lending decisions with limits on capital available: the polygamous marriage problem. European Journal of Operational Research, 249 (2), 407-416. (doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2015.01.047).

Record type: Article

Abstract

In order to stimulate or subdue the economy, banking regulators have sought to impose caps or floors on individual bank's lending to certain types of borrowers. This paper shows that the resultant decision problem for a bank of which potential borrower to accept is a variant of the marriage/secretary problem where one can accept several applicants. The paper solves the decision problem using dynamic programming. We give results on the form of the optimal lending problem and counter examples to further “reasonable” conjectures which do not hold in the general case. By solving numerical examples we show the potential loss of profit and the inconsistency in the lending decision that are caused by introducing floors and caps on lending. The paper also describes some other situations where the same decision occurs.

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Accepted/In Press date: 22 January 2015
e-pub ahead of print date: 31 January 2015
Published date: 1 March 2016
Keywords: dynamic programming, markov processes, consumer credit lending
Organisations: Southampton Business School

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 374077
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/374077
ISSN: 0377-2217
PURE UUID: f0aa5e21-3293-4dc1-9ba8-165437b4b4b1
ORCID for M.C. So: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-8507-4222

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 05 Feb 2015 14:10
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:29

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Contributors

Author: M.C. So ORCID iD
Author: L.C. Thomas
Author: B. Huang

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