Securing finance: the paradox of Steuart’s watch
Securing finance: the paradox of Steuart’s watch
This paper examines the changes that have been made to the global financial architecture in the aftermath of the financial crisis and argues that the reforms are confronted with a paradox. Intervention is required to ensure the smooth running of the economy, yet too heavy a hand risks disrupting a central circuit of capital. We have recently witnessed a tightening of the regulatory mechanism such that the parameters of risk taking have been reduced—financial activity now modulates within a more risk adverse environment. Yet, the reforms are not as radical as they could have been, reflecting the need to ensure effective and efficient circulation within an increasingly important area of the economy. However, a stronger emphasis on pre-emptive surveillance has emerged, which may partly compensate for the lack of radical reforms in other areas
1-21
Glenn, John
d843e423-d1f9-4be5-b667-8e44a42efff2
Glenn, John
d843e423-d1f9-4be5-b667-8e44a42efff2
Abstract
This paper examines the changes that have been made to the global financial architecture in the aftermath of the financial crisis and argues that the reforms are confronted with a paradox. Intervention is required to ensure the smooth running of the economy, yet too heavy a hand risks disrupting a central circuit of capital. We have recently witnessed a tightening of the regulatory mechanism such that the parameters of risk taking have been reduced—financial activity now modulates within a more risk adverse environment. Yet, the reforms are not as radical as they could have been, reflecting the need to ensure effective and efficient circulation within an increasingly important area of the economy. However, a stronger emphasis on pre-emptive surveillance has emerged, which may partly compensate for the lack of radical reforms in other areas
Text
JG - Securing Finance-Glenn CRIA Edit.doc
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
e-pub ahead of print date: 14 April 2015
Organisations:
Politics & International Relations
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 381957
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/381957
ISSN: 0955-7571
PURE UUID: 1a7a7273-96a9-4f92-b361-64b1845368cc
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 19 Oct 2015 10:44
Last modified: 22 Aug 2025 01:42
Export record
Altmetrics
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics
