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Payment prioritisation and liquidity risk in collateralised interbank payment systems

Payment prioritisation and liquidity risk in collateralised interbank payment systems
Payment prioritisation and liquidity risk in collateralised interbank payment systems
Participants in interbank payment systems manage a stream of payment requests of varying priority to minimise their total costs. However, individually optimal strategies may conflict with system-wide optimality and can lead to inefficient equilibria, where banks cannot meet obligations in a timely manner. We construct a model of a collateralised payment system and demonstrate that socially optimal states exist in which banks should delay a proportion of non-priority payments in an internal queue, but banks' strategising behaviour leads to liquidity hoarding and increased systemic cost. We discuss how this behaviour can be reduced using measures available to a regulator
agent based, game theory, payment systems, policy, simulation
1042-4431
139-150
De Caux, Bob
a3e6d29e-ed87-4803-b08d-36392c5bf1dd
Brede, Markus
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7
McGroarty, Frank
693a5396-8e01-4d68-8973-d74184c03072
De Caux, Bob
a3e6d29e-ed87-4803-b08d-36392c5bf1dd
Brede, Markus
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7
McGroarty, Frank
693a5396-8e01-4d68-8973-d74184c03072

De Caux, Bob, Brede, Markus and McGroarty, Frank (2016) Payment prioritisation and liquidity risk in collateralised interbank payment systems. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 41, 139-150. (doi:10.1016/j.intfin.2015.12.009).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Participants in interbank payment systems manage a stream of payment requests of varying priority to minimise their total costs. However, individually optimal strategies may conflict with system-wide optimality and can lead to inefficient equilibria, where banks cannot meet obligations in a timely manner. We construct a model of a collateralised payment system and demonstrate that socially optimal states exist in which banks should delay a proportion of non-priority payments in an internal queue, but banks' strategising behaviour leads to liquidity hoarding and increased systemic cost. We discuss how this behaviour can be reduced using measures available to a regulator

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More information

Accepted/In Press date: 23 December 2015
e-pub ahead of print date: 23 January 2016
Published date: March 2016
Keywords: agent based, game theory, payment systems, policy, simulation
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity, Southampton Business School

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 383898
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/383898
ISSN: 1042-4431
PURE UUID: c4a00ba1-e77f-4602-b391-5d9c491cd09b
ORCID for Frank McGroarty: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-2962-0927

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 27 Nov 2015 14:51
Last modified: 20 Jul 2019 06:05

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Contributors

Author: Bob De Caux
Author: Markus Brede
Author: Frank McGroarty ORCID iD

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