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Demandingness objections in ethics

Demandingness objections in ethics
Demandingness objections in ethics
It is common for moral philosophers to reject a moral theory on the basis that its verdicts are unreasonably demanding—it requires too much of us to be a correct account of our moral obligations. Even though such objections frequently strike us as convincing, they give rise to two challenges: Are demandingness objections really independent of other objections to moral theories? Do standard demandingness objections not presuppose that costs borne by the comfortably off are more important than costs borne by the poor? These challenges have led some writers to question whether there really can be convincing demandingness objections, notwithstanding their strong initial appeal. David Sobel has argued that standard demandingness objections are ‘impotent’, Liam Murphy that they can be ‘dissolved’. In this paper, I aim to vindicate the possibility of demandingness objections by addressing these two challenges.
0031-8094
84–105
Mcelwee, Brian
7e1ceac9-766b-412a-9597-98caab46f07b
Mcelwee, Brian
7e1ceac9-766b-412a-9597-98caab46f07b

Mcelwee, Brian (2017) Demandingness objections in ethics. The Philosophical Quarterly, 67 (266), 84–105. (doi:10.1093/pq/pqw020).

Record type: Article

Abstract

It is common for moral philosophers to reject a moral theory on the basis that its verdicts are unreasonably demanding—it requires too much of us to be a correct account of our moral obligations. Even though such objections frequently strike us as convincing, they give rise to two challenges: Are demandingness objections really independent of other objections to moral theories? Do standard demandingness objections not presuppose that costs borne by the comfortably off are more important than costs borne by the poor? These challenges have led some writers to question whether there really can be convincing demandingness objections, notwithstanding their strong initial appeal. David Sobel has argued that standard demandingness objections are ‘impotent’, Liam Murphy that they can be ‘dissolved’. In this paper, I aim to vindicate the possibility of demandingness objections by addressing these two challenges.

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Demandingness Objections in Ethics PQ Final Version - Accepted Manuscript
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Accepted/In Press date: 8 October 2015
e-pub ahead of print date: 15 March 2016
Published date: January 2017
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 398749
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/398749
ISSN: 0031-8094
PURE UUID: f65f3a16-d7aa-45ac-a1a7-638833837a66

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Date deposited: 02 Aug 2016 08:35
Last modified: 07 Jan 2022 21:51

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