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Double effect, doing and allowing, and the relaxed nonconsequentialist

Double effect, doing and allowing, and the relaxed nonconsequentialist
Double effect, doing and allowing, and the relaxed nonconsequentialist
Many philosophers display relaxed scepticism about the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA) and the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), suspecting, without great alarm, that one or both of these Doctrines is indefensible. This relaxed scepticism is misplaced. Anyone who aims to endorse a theory of right action with Nonconsequentialist implications (henceforth any Nonconsequentialist) should accept both the DDA (or a replacement) and the DDE (or a replacement). First, even to state a Nonconsequentialist theory requires drawing a distinction between respecting and promoting values. This cannot be done without accepting some deontological distinction. Second, if someone is going to accept any deontological distinction she should accept either the DDE or the DDA or some replacement. Finally, anyone who accepts either the DDE or the DDA should accept both doctrines or a replacement of each. Unless both Doctrines can be defended or given a defensible replacement, any Nonconsequentialist is in trouble.
1386-9795
142-158
Woollard, Fiona
c3caccc2-68c9-47c8-b2d3-9735d09f1679
Woollard, Fiona
c3caccc2-68c9-47c8-b2d3-9735d09f1679

Woollard, Fiona (2017) Double effect, doing and allowing, and the relaxed nonconsequentialist. Philosophical Explorations, 20 (Sup. 2), 142-158. (doi:10.1080/13869795.2017.1356355).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Many philosophers display relaxed scepticism about the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA) and the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), suspecting, without great alarm, that one or both of these Doctrines is indefensible. This relaxed scepticism is misplaced. Anyone who aims to endorse a theory of right action with Nonconsequentialist implications (henceforth any Nonconsequentialist) should accept both the DDA (or a replacement) and the DDE (or a replacement). First, even to state a Nonconsequentialist theory requires drawing a distinction between respecting and promoting values. This cannot be done without accepting some deontological distinction. Second, if someone is going to accept any deontological distinction she should accept either the DDE or the DDA or some replacement. Finally, anyone who accepts either the DDE or the DDA should accept both doctrines or a replacement of each. Unless both Doctrines can be defended or given a defensible replacement, any Nonconsequentialist is in trouble.

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Accepted/In Press date: 24 March 2017
e-pub ahead of print date: 13 October 2017
Organisations: Philosophy

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Local EPrints ID: 402192
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/402192
ISSN: 1386-9795
PURE UUID: 25045248-2c9f-43fa-8a4f-0cde19132581

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Date deposited: 03 Nov 2016 13:56
Last modified: 07 Oct 2020 04:36

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Contributors

Author: Fiona Woollard

University divisions

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