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Social welfare in one-sided matching mechanisms

Social welfare in one-sided matching mechanisms
Social welfare in one-sided matching mechanisms
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated. We present a general lower bound of ?(n???) on the Price of Anarchy, which applies to all mechanisms. We show that two well-known mechanisms, Probabilistic Serial, and Random Priority, achieve a matching upper bound. We extend our lower bound to the Price of Stability of a large class of mechanisms that satisfy a common proportionality property, and show stronger bounds on the Price of Anarchy of all deterministic mechanisms.
30-50
Christodoulou, George
a6890185-8c0b-4b9d-9cc3-61310576a751
Filos-Ratsikas, Aris
14e554b2-bc6b-4b2c-a84d-8650ad4bed14
Frederiksen, Soren Kristoffer Stiil
3e896a21-0be0-4102-895d-2370e32c28ae
Goldberg, Paul W.
46b110bb-a7df-406d-babc-291a17fff863
Zhang, Jie
6bad4e75-40e0-4ea3-866d-58c8018b225a
Zhang, Jinshan
dceaf1fe-451c-4cdd-87d8-1ed661bf468e
Christodoulou, George
a6890185-8c0b-4b9d-9cc3-61310576a751
Filos-Ratsikas, Aris
14e554b2-bc6b-4b2c-a84d-8650ad4bed14
Frederiksen, Soren Kristoffer Stiil
3e896a21-0be0-4102-895d-2370e32c28ae
Goldberg, Paul W.
46b110bb-a7df-406d-babc-291a17fff863
Zhang, Jie
6bad4e75-40e0-4ea3-866d-58c8018b225a
Zhang, Jinshan
dceaf1fe-451c-4cdd-87d8-1ed661bf468e

Christodoulou, George, Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, Frederiksen, Soren Kristoffer Stiil, Goldberg, Paul W., Zhang, Jie and Zhang, Jinshan (2016) Social welfare in one-sided matching mechanisms. pp. 30-50. (doi:10.1007/978-3-319-46882-2_3).

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Other)

Abstract

We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated. We present a general lower bound of ?(n???) on the Price of Anarchy, which applies to all mechanisms. We show that two well-known mechanisms, Probabilistic Serial, and Random Priority, achieve a matching upper bound. We extend our lower bound to the Price of Stability of a large class of mechanisms that satisfy a common proportionality property, and show stronger bounds on the Price of Anarchy of all deterministic mechanisms.

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e-pub ahead of print date: 24 September 2016
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 402577
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/402577
PURE UUID: b5f95ce2-0ee6-41d1-8e8f-b75006d406f0
ORCID for Jie Zhang: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-1380-9952

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Date deposited: 29 Nov 2016 09:29
Last modified: 06 Jun 2018 12:14

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Contributors

Author: George Christodoulou
Author: Aris Filos-Ratsikas
Author: Soren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen
Author: Paul W. Goldberg
Author: Jie Zhang ORCID iD
Author: Jinshan Zhang

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