The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Barry and Øverland on Doing, Allowing, and Enabling Harm

Barry and Øverland on Doing, Allowing, and Enabling Harm
Barry and Øverland on Doing, Allowing, and Enabling Harm
In Responding to Global Poverty: Harm, Responsibility, and Agency, Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland address the two types of argument that have dominated discussion of the responsibilities of the affluent to respond to global poverty. The first type of argument appeals to what Barry and Øverland call “assistance-based responsibilities”: the affluent are required to do something about global poverty simply because those in poverty need help to avoid serious suffering and the affluent are able to give such help. The second type appeals to “contribution-based responsibilities”: the affluent have a duty to do something about the plight of the global poor because they have contributed to that plight. As Barry and Øverland note, assessing the second type of argument requires an understanding of the difference between contributing to an outcome and simply failing to prevent it. They therefore engage with (in their words) “the literature on the so-called ‘doing/allowing’ distinction.” In this paper, I’ll outline Barry and Øverland’s account of the ways an agent might contribute to a harmful outcome and then discuss some concerns.
1654-4951
Woollard, Fiona
c3caccc2-68c9-47c8-b2d3-9735d09f1679
Woollard, Fiona
c3caccc2-68c9-47c8-b2d3-9735d09f1679

Woollard, Fiona (2017) Barry and Øverland on Doing, Allowing, and Enabling Harm. Ethics & Global Politics.

Record type: Article

Abstract

In Responding to Global Poverty: Harm, Responsibility, and Agency, Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland address the two types of argument that have dominated discussion of the responsibilities of the affluent to respond to global poverty. The first type of argument appeals to what Barry and Øverland call “assistance-based responsibilities”: the affluent are required to do something about global poverty simply because those in poverty need help to avoid serious suffering and the affluent are able to give such help. The second type appeals to “contribution-based responsibilities”: the affluent have a duty to do something about the plight of the global poor because they have contributed to that plight. As Barry and Øverland note, assessing the second type of argument requires an understanding of the difference between contributing to an outcome and simply failing to prevent it. They therefore engage with (in their words) “the literature on the so-called ‘doing/allowing’ distinction.” In this paper, I’ll outline Barry and Øverland’s account of the ways an agent might contribute to a harmful outcome and then discuss some concerns.

Text Final version Woollard Barry and Overland on Doing - Accepted Manuscript
Download (36kB)

More information

Accepted/In Press date: 25 September 2017

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 414440
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/414440
ISSN: 1654-4951
PURE UUID: e82e7a42-526c-4839-b7a6-ba6e45adfd53

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 29 Sep 2017 16:31
Last modified: 29 Sep 2017 16:31

Export record

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×