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Coordination of electric vehicle aggregators: a coalitional approach

Coordination of electric vehicle aggregators: a coalitional approach
Coordination of electric vehicle aggregators: a coalitional approach
Given the rapid rise of electric vehicles (EVs) worldwide, and the ambitious targets set for the near future, the smart charging of an EV fleet must be seen as a priority. Specifically, we study a scenario where EV charging is managed through self-interested EV aggregators (e.g. car parks or electricity suppliers) who compete in the day-ahead market in order to purchase the electricity needed to meet their clients’ requirements. In order to reduce electricity costs and lower the impact on electricity markets, we study the possibility of inter-aggregator cooperation. Specifically, we model the system as a coalitional game and prove that the resulting game is superadditive and balanced, hence having a non-empty core. However, due to the game not being convex, the Shapley value is not guaranteed to lie in the core. As an alternative, we propose employing the payment mechanism provided by the least-core, which we show to be in the core in our setting. Furthermore, a realistic empirical evaluation is presented, using real market and driver data from the Iberian Peninsula. The simulations show that large payment reductions can be achieved when using the coordination mechanism. Moreover, we show that the individual payments of the least-core are very close to the Shapley value, suggesting that the payment mechanism is both fair and stable.
electric vehicle, Aggregation, cooperative game theory, coalition, day-ahead, shapley value, least-core
676-684
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Perez-Diaz, Alvaro
dc83bca5-5108-4448-878f-23e73dec4c88
Gerding, Enrico
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
McGroarty, Frank
693a5396-8e01-4d68-8973-d74184c03072
Perez-Diaz, Alvaro
dc83bca5-5108-4448-878f-23e73dec4c88
Gerding, Enrico
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
McGroarty, Frank
693a5396-8e01-4d68-8973-d74184c03072

Perez-Diaz, Alvaro, Gerding, Enrico and McGroarty, Frank (2018) Coordination of electric vehicle aggregators: a coalitional approach. In 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018. vol. 1, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS). pp. 676-684 .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

Given the rapid rise of electric vehicles (EVs) worldwide, and the ambitious targets set for the near future, the smart charging of an EV fleet must be seen as a priority. Specifically, we study a scenario where EV charging is managed through self-interested EV aggregators (e.g. car parks or electricity suppliers) who compete in the day-ahead market in order to purchase the electricity needed to meet their clients’ requirements. In order to reduce electricity costs and lower the impact on electricity markets, we study the possibility of inter-aggregator cooperation. Specifically, we model the system as a coalitional game and prove that the resulting game is superadditive and balanced, hence having a non-empty core. However, due to the game not being convex, the Shapley value is not guaranteed to lie in the core. As an alternative, we propose employing the payment mechanism provided by the least-core, which we show to be in the core in our setting. Furthermore, a realistic empirical evaluation is presented, using real market and driver data from the Iberian Peninsula. The simulations show that large payment reductions can be achieved when using the coordination mechanism. Moreover, we show that the individual payments of the least-core are very close to the Shapley value, suggesting that the payment mechanism is both fair and stable.

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Accepted/In Press date: 30 January 2018
Published date: 2018
Venue - Dates: Seventeenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2018)<br/>, Sweden, 2018-07-10 - 2018-07-15
Keywords: electric vehicle, Aggregation, cooperative game theory, coalition, day-ahead, shapley value, least-core

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 418136
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/418136
PURE UUID: e6e364bf-b349-4889-9973-cdbfe5d62f97
ORCID for Alvaro Perez-Diaz: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-8081-0772
ORCID for Enrico Gerding: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-7200-552X
ORCID for Frank McGroarty: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-2962-0927

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 22 Feb 2018 17:30
Last modified: 23 May 2020 00:29

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Contributors

Author: Alvaro Perez-Diaz ORCID iD
Author: Enrico Gerding ORCID iD
Author: Frank McGroarty ORCID iD

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