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Shareholders of the world united?: Organized Labour's Preferences on Corporate Governance under Pension Fund Capitalism in the United States, United Kingdom and France

Shareholders of the world united?: Organized Labour's Preferences on Corporate Governance under Pension Fund Capitalism in the United States, United Kingdom and France
Shareholders of the world united?: Organized Labour's Preferences on Corporate Governance under Pension Fund Capitalism in the United States, United Kingdom and France
This article considers whether organized labour’s engagement with shareholder activism represents a shift in unions’ traditional stakeholder preferences on corporate governance under pension fund capitalism. It does so in light of recent critiques of the class power thesis of corporate governance which suggest greater fluidity and fragmentation in labour’s approach. Adopting a diverse case study strategy to compare organized labour’s actions in the United States, United Kingdom and France, the paper explains these activities as innovative strategies, similar to other revitalization initiatives, designed to advance traditional agendas by alternative means. The paper thus concludes that, while organized labour’s shareholder activism is unexpected under the class power thesis, its core preferences remain largely unchanged.
0007-1080
651-675
Bridgen, Paul
6a2060f6-cbab-47d4-a831-ff82350055c9
Naczyk, Marek
60121499-0b96-4aef-b1de-d36fdda668b3
Bridgen, Paul
6a2060f6-cbab-47d4-a831-ff82350055c9
Naczyk, Marek
60121499-0b96-4aef-b1de-d36fdda668b3

Bridgen, Paul and Naczyk, Marek (2019) Shareholders of the world united?: Organized Labour's Preferences on Corporate Governance under Pension Fund Capitalism in the United States, United Kingdom and France. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 57 (3), 651-675. (doi:10.1111/bjir.12424).

Record type: Article

Abstract

This article considers whether organized labour’s engagement with shareholder activism represents a shift in unions’ traditional stakeholder preferences on corporate governance under pension fund capitalism. It does so in light of recent critiques of the class power thesis of corporate governance which suggest greater fluidity and fragmentation in labour’s approach. Adopting a diverse case study strategy to compare organized labour’s actions in the United States, United Kingdom and France, the paper explains these activities as innovative strategies, similar to other revitalization initiatives, designed to advance traditional agendas by alternative means. The paper thus concludes that, while organized labour’s shareholder activism is unexpected under the class power thesis, its core preferences remain largely unchanged.

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More information

Accepted/In Press date: 4 June 2018
e-pub ahead of print date: 9 July 2018
Published date: 1 January 2019

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 420461
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/420461
ISSN: 0007-1080
PURE UUID: 1f40dde6-60f4-4db6-a798-8b29847b4a09
ORCID for Paul Bridgen: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-6039-3254

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 08 May 2018 16:30
Last modified: 28 Mar 2020 01:26

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