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Regulating European Union lobbying: in whose interest?

Regulating European Union lobbying: in whose interest?
Regulating European Union lobbying: in whose interest?
Designing a regime regulating supranational lobbying is a contentious topic in the EU interinstitutional dialogue. Recently, the Commission drafted a proposal for an Interinstitutional Agreement on a Mandatory Transparency Register, and during this formulation process it consulted broadly with stakeholders. A key question is to which stakeholders has the Commission aligned itself with when designing this proposal? I argue the Commission acted as a legitimacy maximizer aiming to bolster its leverage in interinstitutional negotiations. To enhance input legitimacy, it had to build a reputation for being a responsive and representative policy initiator. To enhance output legitimacy, it needed a reputation for being a competent regulator. The analyses show the Commission prioritized input over output legitimacy and building a reputation for regulating lobbying in line with preferences of stakeholders representing the public interest. In politicized contexts, the Commission trades long-standing policy networks for a realignment with stakeholders that serve its legitimacy needs.
https://www.tandfonline.com/keyword/European+Commission
1350-1763
Bunea, Adriana
35890bfe-2932-48ee-aef8-4a393a42eed1
Bunea, Adriana
35890bfe-2932-48ee-aef8-4a393a42eed1

Bunea, Adriana (2018) Regulating European Union lobbying: in whose interest? Journal of European Public Policy. (doi:10.1080/13501763.2018.1539115).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Designing a regime regulating supranational lobbying is a contentious topic in the EU interinstitutional dialogue. Recently, the Commission drafted a proposal for an Interinstitutional Agreement on a Mandatory Transparency Register, and during this formulation process it consulted broadly with stakeholders. A key question is to which stakeholders has the Commission aligned itself with when designing this proposal? I argue the Commission acted as a legitimacy maximizer aiming to bolster its leverage in interinstitutional negotiations. To enhance input legitimacy, it had to build a reputation for being a responsive and representative policy initiator. To enhance output legitimacy, it needed a reputation for being a competent regulator. The analyses show the Commission prioritized input over output legitimacy and building a reputation for regulating lobbying in line with preferences of stakeholders representing the public interest. In politicized contexts, the Commission trades long-standing policy networks for a realignment with stakeholders that serve its legitimacy needs.

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Accepted Bunea Regulating EU lobbying JEPP - Accepted Manuscript
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More information

Accepted/In Press date: 1 October 2018
e-pub ahead of print date: 30 October 2018
Keywords: https://www.tandfonline.com/keyword/European+Commission

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 425729
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/425729
ISSN: 1350-1763
PURE UUID: 7189e168-c532-4924-b43a-28ba7c5aeea3

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Date deposited: 12 Jul 2019 16:56
Last modified: 16 Dec 2019 17:53

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