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Finding and verifying the nucleolus of cooperative games

Finding and verifying the nucleolus of cooperative games
Finding and verifying the nucleolus of cooperative games
The nucleolus offers a desirable payoff-sharing solution in cooperative games, thanks to its attractive properties ---it always exists and lies in the core (if the core is non-empty), and is unique. The nucleolus is considered as the most `stable' solution in the sense that it lexicographically minimize the dissatisfactions among all coalitions. Although computing the nucleolus is very challenging, the Kohlberg criterion offers a powerful method for verifying whether a solution is the nucleolus in relatively small games (i.e., with a number of players $n \leq 15$). This approach, however, becomes more challenging for larger games because of the need to form and check the balancedness of possibly exponentially large collections of coalitions, with each collection potentially of an exponentially large size. The aim of this work is twofold. First, we develop an efficient version of the Kohlberg criterion that involves checking the balancedness of at most $n-1$ sets of coalitions. Second, we exploit these results and introduce a new constructive algorithm to find the nucleolus efficiently. We also provide a compact representation of tight sets and a fast algorithm for verifying balancedness. Our contribution includes the first open-source code for computing the nucleolus.
University of Southampton
Benedek, Marton
72bc97bc-a373-4b88-9e9f-145d62551214
Fliege, Joerg
54978787-a271-4f70-8494-3c701c893d98
Nguyen, Tri-Dung
a6aa7081-6bf7-488a-b72f-510328958a8e
Benedek, Marton
72bc97bc-a373-4b88-9e9f-145d62551214
Fliege, Joerg
54978787-a271-4f70-8494-3c701c893d98
Nguyen, Tri-Dung
a6aa7081-6bf7-488a-b72f-510328958a8e

Benedek, Marton, Fliege, Joerg and Nguyen, Tri-Dung (2018) Finding and verifying the nucleolus of cooperative games University of Southampton

Record type: Monograph (Working Paper)

Abstract

The nucleolus offers a desirable payoff-sharing solution in cooperative games, thanks to its attractive properties ---it always exists and lies in the core (if the core is non-empty), and is unique. The nucleolus is considered as the most `stable' solution in the sense that it lexicographically minimize the dissatisfactions among all coalitions. Although computing the nucleolus is very challenging, the Kohlberg criterion offers a powerful method for verifying whether a solution is the nucleolus in relatively small games (i.e., with a number of players $n \leq 15$). This approach, however, becomes more challenging for larger games because of the need to form and check the balancedness of possibly exponentially large collections of coalitions, with each collection potentially of an exponentially large size. The aim of this work is twofold. First, we develop an efficient version of the Kohlberg criterion that involves checking the balancedness of at most $n-1$ sets of coalitions. Second, we exploit these results and introduce a new constructive algorithm to find the nucleolus efficiently. We also provide a compact representation of tight sets and a fast algorithm for verifying balancedness. Our contribution includes the first open-source code for computing the nucleolus.

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More information

In preparation date: 2018

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 426473
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/426473
PURE UUID: 8d6dab97-274f-4203-a983-9c5616401d14
ORCID for Joerg Fliege: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-4459-5419

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 28 Nov 2018 17:30
Last modified: 14 Mar 2019 01:39

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