Wittgensteinian facts as ultimate items of Tractarian ontology?

Abstract

According to José Zalabardo’s reading, Wittgenstein in TLP solves the metaphysical problem of the unity of facts, i.e. the problem of how their unity arises from the manifold of their constituents, by holding that

(1) Facts ‘should not to be construed as compounds. They don’t arise from the combination of constituents. They are ultimate, indivisible units.’ (p. 14)

The fact that Pavarotti sings, for example, is not a compound. Consequently, Zalabardo holds, Pavarotti and the property of singing are not components:

(2) Objects (properties and relations) are ‘features of facts’ (p. 19),

they are common characteristic marks of classes of facts. Zalabardo moreover holds that, as a consequence

(3) ‘Facts are the only ultimate items of Tractarian ontology.’ (p. 17)

With his intriguing proposal, Zalabardo has both interpretative and theoretical aims and I will similarly discuss both aspects of Zalabardo’s Wittgenstein. Concerning the interpretation, while there is room for challenging that Wittgenstein endorsed theses (1) and (2) (see Horwich’s commentary), for the sake of argument I will grant that Zalabardo is right on this. I will instead argue that maybe (3) does not need to follow in Wittgenstein’s reasoning (§1). Regarding the theoretical import, Zalabardo holds that Wittgenstein’s proposals might not work in the end, but still ‘advance our understanding of the problems in important ways’ (p. 2). I will show that there is room to think that this is not really the case (§2).

More information

Identifiers

ORCID for Giulia Felappi: orcid.org/0000-0002-0110-6371

Catalogue record

Export record

Altmetrics