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Precis of The Illusion of Doubt

Precis of The Illusion of Doubt
Precis of The Illusion of Doubt
The Illusion of Doubt shows that radical scepticism is an illusion generated by a Cartesian picture of our evidential situation—the view that my epistemic grounds in both the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ cases must be the same. It is this picture which issues both a standing invitation to radical scepticism and ensures that there is no way of getting out of it while agreeing to the sceptic’s terms. The sceptical problem cannot, therefore, be answered ‘directly’. Rather, the assumptions that give rise to it, need to be undermined. These include the notion that radical scepticism can be motivated by the ‘closure’ principle for knowledge, that the ‘Indistinguishability Argument’ renders the Cartesian conception compulsory, that the ‘New Evil Genius Thesis’ is coherent, and the demand for a ‘global validation’ of our epistemic practices makes sense. Once these dogmas are
undermined, the path is clear for a ‘realism without empiricism’ that allows us to re-establish unmediated contact with the objects and persons in our environment which an illusion of doubt had threatened to put forever beyond our cognitive grasp.
radical scepticism – Cartesian picture – Reasons Identity Thesis – New Evil Genius Thesis – closure principle
2210-5697
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
586652b5-20da-47cf-9719-4fc587dfa4e8
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
586652b5-20da-47cf-9719-4fc587dfa4e8

Schönbaumsfeld, Genia (2020) Precis of The Illusion of Doubt. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. (doi:10.1163/22105700-bja10001).

Record type: Article

Abstract

The Illusion of Doubt shows that radical scepticism is an illusion generated by a Cartesian picture of our evidential situation—the view that my epistemic grounds in both the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ cases must be the same. It is this picture which issues both a standing invitation to radical scepticism and ensures that there is no way of getting out of it while agreeing to the sceptic’s terms. The sceptical problem cannot, therefore, be answered ‘directly’. Rather, the assumptions that give rise to it, need to be undermined. These include the notion that radical scepticism can be motivated by the ‘closure’ principle for knowledge, that the ‘Indistinguishability Argument’ renders the Cartesian conception compulsory, that the ‘New Evil Genius Thesis’ is coherent, and the demand for a ‘global validation’ of our epistemic practices makes sense. Once these dogmas are
undermined, the path is clear for a ‘realism without empiricism’ that allows us to re-establish unmediated contact with the objects and persons in our environment which an illusion of doubt had threatened to put forever beyond our cognitive grasp.

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Synopsis of The Illusion of Doubt - Accepted Manuscript
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Accepted/In Press date: 22 February 2020
e-pub ahead of print date: 9 March 2020
Keywords: radical scepticism – Cartesian picture – Reasons Identity Thesis – New Evil Genius Thesis – closure principle

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 438908
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/438908
ISSN: 2210-5697
PURE UUID: 5d38e328-1dcf-4320-a51e-5f3e35bacae6

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Date deposited: 26 Mar 2020 17:31
Last modified: 13 Dec 2021 05:52

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