An evolutionary game model analysis on emission control areas in China
An evolutionary game model analysis on emission control areas in China
To improve the atmospheric environment of coastal areas, it is important to coordinate the accomplishment of the Emission Control Areas (ECAs) program development. However, it is difficult to achieve this objective to align the conflict interest between the government and shipping companies. This paper analyzes the differences in the benefits of the two main subjects in the implementation of China's ECA supervision. Then, based on a non-perfect rational hypothesis, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze and test the dynamic changes of participants' decision-making. Furthermore, we contrast the effects of the interfering elements (e.g., uncooperative penalty, external benefits, the shipping company cost, and third-party report rate) on their decisions under various terms, by applying simulation analysis method. The paper’s outcomes demonstrate that, to inspire shipping companies to comply with ECA regulations, the government should apply a strategy, which is following dynamic penalty, to make shipping companies more willing to execute the ECA regulation within less time. Additionally, enhancing the external benefits of cooperative shipping companies and encouraging the participation of third-parties including non-governmental organizations and individuals in monitoring ECAs, are effective ways of stimulating shipping companies to comply with ECA regulations.
Behavior decisions, Emission control areas, Evolutionary game, System dynamics theory
Jiang, Bao
4af1794d-2403-4a66-b21f-658812df7986
Wang, Xiaoqiong
8b1442d7-623d-4714-9d7c-2a8046dd2495
Xue, Hailiang
c28c1ff4-acbe-401f-b846-193b3681e99b
Li, Jian
572c0e67-99fd-4842-b0af-2764c69c2d17
Gong, Yu
86c8d37a-744d-46ab-8b43-18447ccaf39c
August 2020
Jiang, Bao
4af1794d-2403-4a66-b21f-658812df7986
Wang, Xiaoqiong
8b1442d7-623d-4714-9d7c-2a8046dd2495
Xue, Hailiang
c28c1ff4-acbe-401f-b846-193b3681e99b
Li, Jian
572c0e67-99fd-4842-b0af-2764c69c2d17
Gong, Yu
86c8d37a-744d-46ab-8b43-18447ccaf39c
Jiang, Bao, Wang, Xiaoqiong, Xue, Hailiang, Li, Jian and Gong, Yu
(2020)
An evolutionary game model analysis on emission control areas in China.
Marine Policy, 118, [104010].
(doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104010).
Abstract
To improve the atmospheric environment of coastal areas, it is important to coordinate the accomplishment of the Emission Control Areas (ECAs) program development. However, it is difficult to achieve this objective to align the conflict interest between the government and shipping companies. This paper analyzes the differences in the benefits of the two main subjects in the implementation of China's ECA supervision. Then, based on a non-perfect rational hypothesis, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze and test the dynamic changes of participants' decision-making. Furthermore, we contrast the effects of the interfering elements (e.g., uncooperative penalty, external benefits, the shipping company cost, and third-party report rate) on their decisions under various terms, by applying simulation analysis method. The paper’s outcomes demonstrate that, to inspire shipping companies to comply with ECA regulations, the government should apply a strategy, which is following dynamic penalty, to make shipping companies more willing to execute the ECA regulation within less time. Additionally, enhancing the external benefits of cooperative shipping companies and encouraging the participation of third-parties including non-governmental organizations and individuals in monitoring ECAs, are effective ways of stimulating shipping companies to comply with ECA regulations.
Text
Evolutionary Game Model analysis
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 2 May 2020
e-pub ahead of print date: 12 May 2020
Published date: August 2020
Additional Information:
Funding Information:
This research was funded by the Social Science Foundation of Shandong Province ( 17CCXJ19 ), and the Foundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities ( 201713011 ).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020
Keywords:
Behavior decisions, Emission control areas, Evolutionary game, System dynamics theory
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 440804
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/440804
ISSN: 0308-597X
PURE UUID: 78ed76b1-ad8c-4e24-9091-62c79ce4e018
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Date deposited: 19 May 2020 16:30
Last modified: 06 Jun 2024 04:11
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Contributors
Author:
Bao Jiang
Author:
Xiaoqiong Wang
Author:
Hailiang Xue
Author:
Jian Li
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