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Anti-BlUFf: towards counterfeit mitigation in IC supply chains using Blockchain and PUF

Anti-BlUFf: towards counterfeit mitigation in IC supply chains using Blockchain and PUF
Anti-BlUFf: towards counterfeit mitigation in IC supply chains using Blockchain and PUF
The complexity of today’s integrated circuit (IC) supply chain, organised in several tiers and including many companies located in different countries, makes it challenging to assess the history and integrity of procured ICs. This enables malicious practices like counterfeiting and insertion of back doors, which are extremely dangerous, especially in supply chains of ICs for industrial control systems used in critical infrastructures, where a country and human lives can be put at risk.
This paper aims at mitigating these issues by introducing Anti-BlUFf (Anti-counterfeiting Blockchainand PUF-based infrastructure), an approach where ICs are uniquely identified and tracked along the chain, across multiple sites, to detect tampering. Our solution is based on consortium blockchain and smart contract technologies, hence it is decentralised, highly available and provides strong guarantees on the integrity of stored data and executed business logic. The unique identification of ICs along the chain is implemented by using physically unclonable functions (PUFs) as tamper-resistant IDs.
We first define the threat model of an adversary interested in tampering with ICs along the supply chain, then provide the design of the tracking system that implements the proposed anti-counterfeiting approach. We present a security analysis of the tracking system against the designated threat model and a prototype evaluation to show its technical feasibility and assess its effectiveness in counterfeit mitigation. Finally, we discuss several key practical aspects concerning our solution ad its integration with real IC supply chains.
1615-5270
445–460
Aniello, Leonardo
9846e2e4-1303-4b8b-9092-5d8e9bb514c3
Halak, Basel
8221f839-0dfd-4f81-9865-37def5f79f33
Chai, Peter
a48af3cb-b1fa-4215-9589-317b73d20db8
Dhall, Riddhi
029930e6-6641-42d9-9f09-628e85f38116
Mihalea, Mircea
09fd5e65-d94f-4ef5-92df-2a3b962666b0
Wilczynski, Adrian
ac3c8afc-8b3b-4ddb-b293-a1c462444a6c
Aniello, Leonardo
9846e2e4-1303-4b8b-9092-5d8e9bb514c3
Halak, Basel
8221f839-0dfd-4f81-9865-37def5f79f33
Chai, Peter
a48af3cb-b1fa-4215-9589-317b73d20db8
Dhall, Riddhi
029930e6-6641-42d9-9f09-628e85f38116
Mihalea, Mircea
09fd5e65-d94f-4ef5-92df-2a3b962666b0
Wilczynski, Adrian
ac3c8afc-8b3b-4ddb-b293-a1c462444a6c

Aniello, Leonardo, Halak, Basel, Chai, Peter, Dhall, Riddhi, Mihalea, Mircea and Wilczynski, Adrian (2020) Anti-BlUFf: towards counterfeit mitigation in IC supply chains using Blockchain and PUF. International Journal of Information Security, 445–460. (doi:10.1007/s10207-020-00513-8).

Record type: Article

Abstract

The complexity of today’s integrated circuit (IC) supply chain, organised in several tiers and including many companies located in different countries, makes it challenging to assess the history and integrity of procured ICs. This enables malicious practices like counterfeiting and insertion of back doors, which are extremely dangerous, especially in supply chains of ICs for industrial control systems used in critical infrastructures, where a country and human lives can be put at risk.
This paper aims at mitigating these issues by introducing Anti-BlUFf (Anti-counterfeiting Blockchainand PUF-based infrastructure), an approach where ICs are uniquely identified and tracked along the chain, across multiple sites, to detect tampering. Our solution is based on consortium blockchain and smart contract technologies, hence it is decentralised, highly available and provides strong guarantees on the integrity of stored data and executed business logic. The unique identification of ICs along the chain is implemented by using physically unclonable functions (PUFs) as tamper-resistant IDs.
We first define the threat model of an adversary interested in tampering with ICs along the supply chain, then provide the design of the tracking system that implements the proposed anti-counterfeiting approach. We present a security analysis of the tracking system against the designated threat model and a prototype evaluation to show its technical feasibility and assess its effectiveness in counterfeit mitigation. Finally, we discuss several key practical aspects concerning our solution ad its integration with real IC supply chains.

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Accepted/In Press date: 4 June 2020
e-pub ahead of print date: 25 June 2020

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 441469
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/441469
ISSN: 1615-5270
PURE UUID: 85f257a0-11b4-4223-ba1e-778b27c4ffea
ORCID for Leonardo Aniello: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-2886-8445
ORCID for Basel Halak: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-3470-7226

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Date deposited: 15 Jun 2020 16:30
Last modified: 04 Aug 2021 04:01

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Contributors

Author: Leonardo Aniello ORCID iD
Author: Basel Halak ORCID iD
Author: Peter Chai
Author: Riddhi Dhall
Author: Mircea Mihalea
Author: Adrian Wilczynski

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