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Non-epistemic perception as technology

Non-epistemic perception as technology
Non-epistemic perception as technology
Some epistemologists and philosophers of mind hold that the non-epistemic perceptual relation of which feature-seeing and object-seeing are special cases is the foundation of perceptual knowledge. This paper argues that such relations are best understood as having only a technological role in explaining perceptual knowledge. After introducing the opposing view in §1, §2 considers why its defenders deny that some cases in which one has perceptual knowledge without the relevant acquaintance relations are counterexamples, detailing their case for lurking inferential epistemology. §§3-4 suggest that this strategy fails in many other cases. While there is a computational tale that might be deemed ‘inferential’ in these cases, there is no corresponding tale in epistemic structure, not even if one rejects what Siegel (2017) calls the ‘Reckoning Model’ of inference. §5 offers a more fundamental dilemma. §6 concludes that there is only a technological role for non-epistemic perception in grounding perceptual knowledge, but allows that it might play a more-than-technological role elsewhere.
1533-6077
Sylvan, Kurt
507b57c8-e6ec-4a02-8b35-6d640b08b61c
Sylvan, Kurt
507b57c8-e6ec-4a02-8b35-6d640b08b61c

Sylvan, Kurt (2020) Non-epistemic perception as technology. Philosophical Issues. (In Press)

Record type: Article

Abstract

Some epistemologists and philosophers of mind hold that the non-epistemic perceptual relation of which feature-seeing and object-seeing are special cases is the foundation of perceptual knowledge. This paper argues that such relations are best understood as having only a technological role in explaining perceptual knowledge. After introducing the opposing view in §1, §2 considers why its defenders deny that some cases in which one has perceptual knowledge without the relevant acquaintance relations are counterexamples, detailing their case for lurking inferential epistemology. §§3-4 suggest that this strategy fails in many other cases. While there is a computational tale that might be deemed ‘inferential’ in these cases, there is no corresponding tale in epistemic structure, not even if one rejects what Siegel (2017) calls the ‘Reckoning Model’ of inference. §5 offers a more fundamental dilemma. §6 concludes that there is only a technological role for non-epistemic perception in grounding perceptual knowledge, but allows that it might play a more-than-technological role elsewhere.

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NonEpistemicPerceptionRevision[1] - Accepted Manuscript
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Accepted/In Press date: 11 July 2020

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 443214
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/443214
ISSN: 1533-6077
PURE UUID: 23b632a2-0dcd-4309-92bd-f4c54f212f21

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Date deposited: 17 Aug 2020 16:30
Last modified: 12 Dec 2021 10:31

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