Propositionalism and questions that do not have correct answers
Propositionalism and questions that do not have correct answers
As the label suggests, according to propositionalism, each intentional mental state, attitude or event is or involves a relation to a proposition. In this paper, I will discuss a case that seems prima facie not to be accountable for by propositionalism. After having presented the case, I will show why it is different from others that have been discussed in the literature as able to show that propositionalism cannot be correct. I will then consider what the propositionalist can say to fix the problem and I will show that no strategy that is genuinely propositionalist seems promising. I will not conclude that propositionalism is doomed. But I will show that if propositionalism can account for our case at all, it can only do so by losing its main appeal, i.e. its elegance and simplicity. But then propositionalism seems to have lost its advantage with respect to its obvious alternative, i.e. a pluralist account according to which mental states, attitudes and events are not all homogeneously relations to propositions, but rather our mental life should be accounted for in terms of a plurality of kinds of relata.
Gappy propositions, Interrogative attitudes, Propositionalism, Questions, Wondering
Felappi, Giulia
9c0bc4c5-5547-434e-8bbd-0c785bece1bc
Felappi, Giulia
9c0bc4c5-5547-434e-8bbd-0c785bece1bc
Abstract
As the label suggests, according to propositionalism, each intentional mental state, attitude or event is or involves a relation to a proposition. In this paper, I will discuss a case that seems prima facie not to be accountable for by propositionalism. After having presented the case, I will show why it is different from others that have been discussed in the literature as able to show that propositionalism cannot be correct. I will then consider what the propositionalist can say to fix the problem and I will show that no strategy that is genuinely propositionalist seems promising. I will not conclude that propositionalism is doomed. But I will show that if propositionalism can account for our case at all, it can only do so by losing its main appeal, i.e. its elegance and simplicity. But then propositionalism seems to have lost its advantage with respect to its obvious alternative, i.e. a pluralist account according to which mental states, attitudes and events are not all homogeneously relations to propositions, but rather our mental life should be accounted for in terms of a plurality of kinds of relata.
Text
little suzy
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 20 July 2021
e-pub ahead of print date: 6 August 2021
Additional Information:
Funding Information:
Thanks to the audiences at PLM4, Bochum, ECAP9, Munich and the workshop Loving, Wondering, Knowing, Southampton, for their helpful feedback. Thanks also to Alex Gedded, Sophie Keeling, Giorgio Lando, Bryan Pickel, Mark Textor, Sandro Zucchi and two anonymous referees for this journal for their insightful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to the British Academy for funding the initial stages of the research that led to this paper (BA small research grant “Loving, wondering, knowing: our mental life and all its aspects”—SG161621).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, The Author(s).
Keywords:
Gappy propositions, Interrogative attitudes, Propositionalism, Questions, Wondering
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 450484
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/450484
ISSN: 0165-0106
PURE UUID: 9e21e773-54e8-45f3-8f84-42706744cf64
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 29 Jul 2021 16:32
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 06:43
Export record
Altmetrics
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics
