A proportional pricing mechanism for ridesharing services with meeting points
A proportional pricing mechanism for ridesharing services with meeting points
Ridesharing is a promising approach for reducing congestion and pollution, and many variants have been studied in the literature over the past decades. In this paper, we consider a novel setting where individuals walk to a common pick-up point and ride together to a single drop-off point from where they walk to their final destination. This setting requires finding the optimal composition of riders and pick-up and drop-off meeting points, as well as an equitable distribution of the costs whereby riders are incentivised to participate. Based on game-theoretic principles, we propose a methodology to determine the optimal pick-up and drop-off points, together with a cost allocation method that is equitable in the sense that it ensures proportionality for sharing the costs, i.e., those who walk more should pay less. We present a formal evaluation of our cost allocation method and empirical evaluation against the Shapley value using real-world and simulated data. Our results show that our approach is computationally more tractable than the Shapley value, as it is linear in time while guaranteeing individual rationality under certain conditions.
Ridesharing, cost allocation, smart mobility, Multiagent Systems, Transportation, Game theory for practical applications
Cipolina-Kun, Lucia
107bf66a-b641-40f3-a82f-52fb57f523ce
Yazdanpanah, Vahid
28f82058-5e51-4f56-be14-191ab5767d56
Stein, Sebastian
cb2325e7-5e63-475e-8a69-9db2dfbdb00b
Gerding, Enrico
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Cipolina-Kun, Lucia
107bf66a-b641-40f3-a82f-52fb57f523ce
Yazdanpanah, Vahid
28f82058-5e51-4f56-be14-191ab5767d56
Stein, Sebastian
cb2325e7-5e63-475e-8a69-9db2dfbdb00b
Gerding, Enrico
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Cipolina-Kun, Lucia, Yazdanpanah, Vahid, Stein, Sebastian and Gerding, Enrico
(2022)
A proportional pricing mechanism for ridesharing services with meeting points.
In,
Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems.
Springer.
(In Press)
Record type:
Book Section
Abstract
Ridesharing is a promising approach for reducing congestion and pollution, and many variants have been studied in the literature over the past decades. In this paper, we consider a novel setting where individuals walk to a common pick-up point and ride together to a single drop-off point from where they walk to their final destination. This setting requires finding the optimal composition of riders and pick-up and drop-off meeting points, as well as an equitable distribution of the costs whereby riders are incentivised to participate. Based on game-theoretic principles, we propose a methodology to determine the optimal pick-up and drop-off points, together with a cost allocation method that is equitable in the sense that it ensures proportionality for sharing the costs, i.e., those who walk more should pay less. We present a formal evaluation of our cost allocation method and empirical evaluation against the Shapley value using real-world and simulated data. Our results show that our approach is computationally more tractable than the Shapley value, as it is linear in time while guaranteeing individual rationality under certain conditions.
Text
PRIMA 2022 A Proportional Pricing Mechanism for Ridesharing Services With Meeting Points
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 4 October 2022
Keywords:
Ridesharing, cost allocation, smart mobility, Multiagent Systems, Transportation, Game theory for practical applications
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Local EPrints ID: 470197
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/470197
PURE UUID: 0587e3ad-74c7-4b42-9857-0a6b54b24a93
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Date deposited: 04 Oct 2022 16:48
Last modified: 11 Oct 2022 02:01
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