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Does IRS monitoring matter for the cost of bank loans?

Does IRS monitoring matter for the cost of bank loans?
Does IRS monitoring matter for the cost of bank loans?
We show that IRS monitoring exerts a significantly negative effect on the cost of syndicated loans. A one standard deviation increase in the probability of an IRS audit decreases loan spreads by around nine basis points. We also find that this effect is stronger for borrowers with better lending relationships and credible access to public markets. These results indicate that IRS monitoring could increase the bargaining power of borrowers and restrain banks from extracting informational rents from their lending relationships. Thus, they provide a novel insight into how IRS monitoring could lower the cost of financing from the banking system.
Syndicated loans, IRS monitoring, Information asymmetry, Lending relationships, Information asymmetry, IRS monitoring, Lending relationships, Syndicated loans
0920-8550
Bermpei, Theodora
9549be8f-7acb-4f52-a237-3a093b9bb584
Kalyvas, Nikolaos A
b90c20b2-9fd4-4d5d-a123-34a193e1ca1d
Wolfe, Simon
9a2367fc-36cc-496a-bbd2-e7346bcbb19e
Bermpei, Theodora
9549be8f-7acb-4f52-a237-3a093b9bb584
Kalyvas, Nikolaos A
b90c20b2-9fd4-4d5d-a123-34a193e1ca1d
Wolfe, Simon
9a2367fc-36cc-496a-bbd2-e7346bcbb19e

Bermpei, Theodora, Kalyvas, Nikolaos A and Wolfe, Simon (2023) Does IRS monitoring matter for the cost of bank loans? Journal of Financial Services Research, [JFSR-D-21-00153R2]. (doi:10.1007/s10693-023-00403-9).

Record type: Article

Abstract

We show that IRS monitoring exerts a significantly negative effect on the cost of syndicated loans. A one standard deviation increase in the probability of an IRS audit decreases loan spreads by around nine basis points. We also find that this effect is stronger for borrowers with better lending relationships and credible access to public markets. These results indicate that IRS monitoring could increase the bargaining power of borrowers and restrain banks from extracting informational rents from their lending relationships. Thus, they provide a novel insight into how IRS monitoring could lower the cost of financing from the banking system.

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Accepted/In Press date: 31 January 2023
e-pub ahead of print date: 15 March 2023
Published date: 15 March 2023
Additional Information: Publisher Copyright: © 2023, Crown.
Keywords: Syndicated loans, IRS monitoring, Information asymmetry, Lending relationships, Information asymmetry, IRS monitoring, Lending relationships, Syndicated loans

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 476571
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/476571
ISSN: 0920-8550
PURE UUID: 8376805a-b5aa-4000-9e2c-16426b65dcd7
ORCID for Nikolaos A Kalyvas: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-4416-7032
ORCID for Simon Wolfe: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-9815-9535

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 09 May 2023 16:40
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 02:39

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Contributors

Author: Theodora Bermpei
Author: Nikolaos A Kalyvas ORCID iD
Author: Simon Wolfe ORCID iD

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