A memristor fingerprinting and characterisation methodology for hardware security
A memristor fingerprinting and characterisation methodology for hardware security
The modern IC supply chain encompasses a large number of steps and manufacturers. In many applications it is critically important that chips are of the right quality and are assured to have been obtained from the legitimate supply chain. To this end, it is necessary to be able to uniquely identify systems to aid in supply chain tracking and quality assurance. Many identifiers, however, can be cloned onto counterfeit devices and are therefore untrustworthy. This paper proposes a methodology for using post-CMOS memristor devices as a fingerprint to uniquely identify ICs. To achieve this, memristors' unique and variable I-V characteristics are exploited to produce a fingerprint that can be generally applicable to a wide variety of different memristor technologies and identifiable over time, even where cell retention is non-ideal. In doing so it aims to minimise the hardware required on-chip both to minimise cost and maximise the auditability of the system. The methodology is applied to a TiOx memristor technology, and shown to be able to identify cells in a set.
9392
Aitchison, Callum
a3e31cb3-c35b-42b5-b0e7-8e8220680b97
Halak, Basel
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Serb, Alex
8895cd22-f076-4bbb-8f28-f4539242b947
Prodromakis, Themis
fc63125d-21a9-4b33-a148-512dd175736f
9 June 2023
Aitchison, Callum
a3e31cb3-c35b-42b5-b0e7-8e8220680b97
Halak, Basel
8221f839-0dfd-4f81-9865-37def5f79f33
Serb, Alex
8895cd22-f076-4bbb-8f28-f4539242b947
Prodromakis, Themis
fc63125d-21a9-4b33-a148-512dd175736f
Aitchison, Callum, Halak, Basel, Serb, Alex and Prodromakis, Themis
(2023)
A memristor fingerprinting and characterisation methodology for hardware security.
Scientific Reports, 13 (1), , [9392].
(doi:10.1038/s41598-023-33051-z).
Abstract
The modern IC supply chain encompasses a large number of steps and manufacturers. In many applications it is critically important that chips are of the right quality and are assured to have been obtained from the legitimate supply chain. To this end, it is necessary to be able to uniquely identify systems to aid in supply chain tracking and quality assurance. Many identifiers, however, can be cloned onto counterfeit devices and are therefore untrustworthy. This paper proposes a methodology for using post-CMOS memristor devices as a fingerprint to uniquely identify ICs. To achieve this, memristors' unique and variable I-V characteristics are exploited to produce a fingerprint that can be generally applicable to a wide variety of different memristor technologies and identifiable over time, even where cell retention is non-ideal. In doing so it aims to minimise the hardware required on-chip both to minimise cost and maximise the auditability of the system. The methodology is applied to a TiOx memristor technology, and shown to be able to identify cells in a set.
Text
A Memristor Fingerprinting and Characterisation Methodology for Hardware Security
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 6 April 2023
Published date: 9 June 2023
Additional Information:
Funding Information:
This work was supported by the UK Research and Innovation Centre for Doctoral Training in Machine Intelligence for Nano-electronic Devices and Systems [EP/S024298/1]. The authors also acknowledge the support of the EPSRC FORTE Programme Grant [EP/R024642/1] and the RAEng Chair in Emerging Technologies [CiET1819/2/93].
Publisher Copyright:
© 2023, The Author(s).
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 477281
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/477281
ISSN: 2045-2322
PURE UUID: b7730d3b-a47d-401b-b9ee-1955afea24cd
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Date deposited: 02 Jun 2023 16:33
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 03:25
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Contributors
Author:
Callum Aitchison
Author:
Basel Halak
Author:
Alex Serb
Author:
Themis Prodromakis
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