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Conditional interchangeability of Nash equilibria

Conditional interchangeability of Nash equilibria
Conditional interchangeability of Nash equilibria

The notion of interchangeability was introduced by Nash in one of his original papers on equilibria in strategic games. It has been recently shown that propositional theory of this relation is the same as propositional theories of the non-deducibility relation in the information flow theory, the independence relation in probability theory, and the non-interference relation in concurrency theory. Propositional theories of conditional non-deducibility and conditional independence have been studied before. This article introduces a notion of conditional interchangeability and gives complete axiomatization of this relation with conditioning by a single player.

axiomatization, completeness, equilibrium, game theory, Interchangeability
0955-792X
1421-1438
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Protzman, Margaret
0df4e2d7-fd8e-4703-ba0c-bd224e31175e
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Protzman, Margaret
0df4e2d7-fd8e-4703-ba0c-bd224e31175e

Naumov, Pavel and Protzman, Margaret (2016) Conditional interchangeability of Nash equilibria. Journal of Logic and Computation, 26 (5), 1421-1438. (doi:10.1093/logcom/exu038).

Record type: Article

Abstract

The notion of interchangeability was introduced by Nash in one of his original papers on equilibria in strategic games. It has been recently shown that propositional theory of this relation is the same as propositional theories of the non-deducibility relation in the information flow theory, the independence relation in probability theory, and the non-interference relation in concurrency theory. Propositional theories of conditional non-deducibility and conditional independence have been studied before. This article introduces a notion of conditional interchangeability and gives complete axiomatization of this relation with conditioning by a single player.

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2014-jlc - Accepted Manuscript
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e-pub ahead of print date: 12 June 2014
Published date: October 2016
Keywords: axiomatization, completeness, equilibrium, game theory, Interchangeability

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 479548
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/479548
ISSN: 0955-792X
PURE UUID: 1d76c4a9-de83-4f48-848d-22d6e96e4b80
ORCID for Pavel Naumov: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-1687-045X

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Date deposited: 26 Jul 2023 16:36
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 04:10

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Contributors

Author: Pavel Naumov ORCID iD
Author: Margaret Protzman

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