Responsibility in infinite games
Responsibility in infinite games
There are two distinct forms of responsibility that can be found in literature: counterfactual responsibility and responsibility for "seeing to it that''. It has been previously observed that, in the case of strategic games, the counterfactual form of responsibility can be defined through responsibility for "seeing to it that'', but not the other way around.
The article considers these two forms of responsibility in the case of infinite extensive form games. The main technical result is that, in this new setting, neither of the two forms of responsibility can be defined through the other. Some preliminary results for finite extensive form games are also given.
Cui, Xiulin
6c59aa56-c07f-454e-8e78-aa7b3ad6f9d2
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Cui, Xiulin
6c59aa56-c07f-454e-8e78-aa7b3ad6f9d2
Naumov, Pavel
8b6c40fb-b199-44d5-a8e2-0ebd021566b0
Cui, Xiulin and Naumov, Pavel
(2024)
Responsibility in infinite games.
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic.
(In Press)
Abstract
There are two distinct forms of responsibility that can be found in literature: counterfactual responsibility and responsibility for "seeing to it that''. It has been previously observed that, in the case of strategic games, the counterfactual form of responsibility can be defined through responsibility for "seeing to it that'', but not the other way around.
The article considers these two forms of responsibility in the case of infinite extensive form games. The main technical result is that, in this new setting, neither of the two forms of responsibility can be defined through the other. Some preliminary results for finite extensive form games are also given.
Text
2024-ndjfl-cn
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 27 June 2024
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 491720
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/491720
ISSN: 0029-4527
PURE UUID: 567f89e6-ad09-4e73-8dbc-3775eb764245
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Date deposited: 03 Jul 2024 16:39
Last modified: 12 Jul 2024 02:10
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Contributors
Author:
Xiulin Cui
Author:
Pavel Naumov
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