Strategic use of social media influencer marketing
Strategic use of social media influencer marketing
We set out a model of social media influencer marketing in which a firm may hire influencers to inform consumers about an innovation. Influencers generate sales through purchases of their followers and followers’ social networks and set prices for their endorsements. In turn, the firm decides which influencers to hire, which story to convey via the influencers, and sets the retail price of the innovation. In equilibrium, influencers price according to their marginal contribution to industry profits and increase consumers’ willingness to pay with their stories. In particular, under a weak condition it is the influencers with the most reactive followers who are hired and obtain positive profits in equilibrium. Finally, we show that the firm may be better off if it could commit to hire fewer influencers.
Social Science Research Network
Förster, Manuel
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Hellmann, Tim
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Vega Redondo, Fernando
1d9358cd-de5f-4e35-b6a7-be2cea3c1050
26 April 2024
Förster, Manuel
5d6b3abb-3de6-4e09-8255-150430d1183c
Hellmann, Tim
e03b4edd-3010-4f6d-831e-86e4b3d6cbe0
Vega Redondo, Fernando
1d9358cd-de5f-4e35-b6a7-be2cea3c1050
Förster, Manuel, Hellmann, Tim and Vega Redondo, Fernando
(2024)
Strategic use of social media influencer marketing
Social Science Research Network
29pp.
(doi:10.2139/ssrn.4808491).
Record type:
Monograph
(Working Paper)
Abstract
We set out a model of social media influencer marketing in which a firm may hire influencers to inform consumers about an innovation. Influencers generate sales through purchases of their followers and followers’ social networks and set prices for their endorsements. In turn, the firm decides which influencers to hire, which story to convey via the influencers, and sets the retail price of the innovation. In equilibrium, influencers price according to their marginal contribution to industry profits and increase consumers’ willingness to pay with their stories. In particular, under a weak condition it is the influencers with the most reactive followers who are hired and obtain positive profits in equilibrium. Finally, we show that the firm may be better off if it could commit to hire fewer influencers.
Text
ssrn-4808491 (1)
- Author's Original
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Published date: 26 April 2024
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 492051
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/492051
PURE UUID: cd8abe91-7091-4894-b19a-eb371c39aae0
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Date deposited: 15 Jul 2024 16:41
Last modified: 15 Jul 2024 16:42
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Author:
Manuel Förster
Author:
Fernando Vega Redondo
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