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Responsibility gaps

Responsibility gaps
Responsibility gaps

Responsibility gaps arise when there is a mismatch between the amount of responsibility that can be attributed to any person or collection of persons on leading accounts of moral responsibility and the amount that robust intuitions suggest should be allocated to someone in a case. Claimed responsibility gaps arise in numerous philosophical debates, including those concerning government, corporate, and other forms of group agency and new technologies and those concerning theoretical issues in the philosophy of responsibility. This work is an opinionated introduction to and overview of recent work on responsibility gaps. It outlines and evaluates paradigmatic responsibility gap cases and ways of understanding the phenomenon as well as the existence conditions and moral status of and possible responses to responsibility gaps. It thereby contributes to ongoing work in the philosophy of responsibility and several applied domains.
AI Ethics, AI Responsibility, Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence Ethics, Group Responsibility, Responsibility, Responsibility Gaps
1747-9991
Da Silva, Michael
05ad649f-8409-4012-8edc-88709b1a3182
Da Silva, Michael
05ad649f-8409-4012-8edc-88709b1a3182

Da Silva, Michael (2024) Responsibility gaps. Philosophy Compass, 19 (9-10), [e70002]. (doi:10.1111/phc3.70002).

Record type: Article

Abstract


Responsibility gaps arise when there is a mismatch between the amount of responsibility that can be attributed to any person or collection of persons on leading accounts of moral responsibility and the amount that robust intuitions suggest should be allocated to someone in a case. Claimed responsibility gaps arise in numerous philosophical debates, including those concerning government, corporate, and other forms of group agency and new technologies and those concerning theoretical issues in the philosophy of responsibility. This work is an opinionated introduction to and overview of recent work on responsibility gaps. It outlines and evaluates paradigmatic responsibility gap cases and ways of understanding the phenomenon as well as the existence conditions and moral status of and possible responses to responsibility gaps. It thereby contributes to ongoing work in the philosophy of responsibility and several applied domains.

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More information

Accepted/In Press date: 21 September 2024
Published date: 11 October 2024
Keywords: AI Ethics, AI Responsibility, Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence Ethics, Group Responsibility, Responsibility, Responsibility Gaps

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 495565
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/495565
ISSN: 1747-9991
PURE UUID: 75ff0701-b45e-4fcc-9ac0-b419dec779b2
ORCID for Michael Da Silva: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-7021-9847

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Date deposited: 18 Nov 2024 17:40
Last modified: 19 Nov 2024 03:02

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Contributors

Author: Michael Da Silva ORCID iD

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