The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view
The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view
From a normative viewpoint, there is no compelling reason for preferring the weak over the strong core, and vice versa. However, the situation changes significantly from a mechanism design perspective. We work in a rights structures environment, where the role of the social planner is to allocate rights to individuals or coalitions which allow them to change the status-quo state. While coalitions are irrelevant for implementation in weak core (Koray and Yildiz in J. Econ. Theory 176:479-502, 2018; Korpela et al. in J. Econ. Theory 185:104953, 2020), our results show that they are fundamental for implementation in strong core. We fully characterize the implementation of social choice rules in strong core to outline this distinction. For robustness, we also characterize double implementation in weak and strong core which we show to be equivalent to implementation in weak core. Finally, we show that this equivalence breaks down in the more realistic case of implementation by codes of rights, where the set of states coincides with the set of outcomes.
Korpela, Ville
0c0cd8cb-b872-4999-bad6-183384ed881a
Lombardi, Michele
97ffb5c7-85c3-42f6-8de9-aeade30da03c
Savva, Foivos
8af4d90b-c08d-4133-93a1-3a8b3c2da24b
Korpela, Ville
0c0cd8cb-b872-4999-bad6-183384ed881a
Lombardi, Michele
97ffb5c7-85c3-42f6-8de9-aeade30da03c
Savva, Foivos
8af4d90b-c08d-4133-93a1-3a8b3c2da24b
Korpela, Ville, Lombardi, Michele and Savva, Foivos
(2024)
The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view.
Economic Theory.
(doi:10.1007/s00199-024-01624-2).
Abstract
From a normative viewpoint, there is no compelling reason for preferring the weak over the strong core, and vice versa. However, the situation changes significantly from a mechanism design perspective. We work in a rights structures environment, where the role of the social planner is to allocate rights to individuals or coalitions which allow them to change the status-quo state. While coalitions are irrelevant for implementation in weak core (Koray and Yildiz in J. Econ. Theory 176:479-502, 2018; Korpela et al. in J. Econ. Theory 185:104953, 2020), our results show that they are fundamental for implementation in strong core. We fully characterize the implementation of social choice rules in strong core to outline this distinction. For robustness, we also characterize double implementation in weak and strong core which we show to be equivalent to implementation in weak core. Finally, we show that this equivalence breaks down in the more realistic case of implementation by codes of rights, where the set of states coincides with the set of outcomes.
Text
s00199-024-01624-2
- Version of Record
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 15 November 2024
e-pub ahead of print date: 26 December 2024
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 497904
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/497904
ISSN: 0938-2259
PURE UUID: a89728e5-1d57-452e-bd4a-962e0774478f
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 04 Feb 2025 17:46
Last modified: 22 Aug 2025 02:33
Export record
Altmetrics
Contributors
Author:
Ville Korpela
Author:
Michele Lombardi
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics
