Subsidiarity, states, and intermediate groups: maintaining subsidiarity’s distinct contribution to moral philosophy

Abstract

Subsidiarity typically refers to the presumption that issues should be addressed at the most ‘local’ level capable of addressing them. Modern work on subsidiarity tends to treat it as a legal principle, with particular emphasis on how it can serve a constitutional function for federal countries and (quasi-)federal regional bodies like the European Union. Yet this constitutional understanding has recently been the subject of several compelling deflationary critiques. This raises a question for those who seek to maintain the concept in political philosophy: What, if anything, is left for the concept to do if deflationary critiques of constitutional interpretations succeed? This article argues that the earlier history of subsidiarity provides a compelling response. More specifically, it argues that subsidiarity can make a distinct contribution to moral ontology when it is understood as a tool for addressing the relationship between groups claiming distinct domains of authority, particularly as between states and ‘intermediate groups’ like churches and universities. The article demonstrates that this approach to subsidiarity has clear historical precedent and continuing contemporary value. The approach thereby fulfills both explanatory and normative desiderata for a theory of a disputed social concept like subsidiarity.

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ORCID for Michael Da Silva: orcid.org/0000-0002-7021-9847

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