Low-stakes accountability and public service turnarounds

Abstract

Can accountability to external bodies induce performance turnarounds in struggling public services? And if so, must account-holders use incentives and sanctions to change organizations that have yet to self-correct, or can a gentler, more informational regime suffice? Using recent research into “low-stakes” accountability, we argue that feedback and standard-setting on their own may stimulate subunit turnarounds in complex, multi-service organizations by directing leaders’ scarce attention, control efforts and resource oversight toward previously unnoticed performance deficits. However, given the potential for “tunnel vision” among account-givers, accountability-induced turnarounds may be confined to dimensions of performance most relevant to the account-holder, to the neglect of others. We test each stage of this theory using quasi-experimental methods on 133 matched local government units and data from the Local Government Ombudsman in England. We show that councils that are notified of maladministration in their social care provision significantly increase leadership attention and control efforts toward this service, and invest more in its core staffing, compared with a matched sample of unnotified councils. On average, the rate of maladministration falls by more than half; though, as predicted, we detect no wider performance gains. The immediacy of the improvement further suggests that responsible subunits may act in anticipation of leaders’ increased attention.

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ORCID for Han Wang: orcid.org/0000-0002-7020-2754

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