The economic and environmental effect of remanufacturing authorization in the fuzzy environment
The economic and environmental effect of remanufacturing authorization in the fuzzy environment
Remanufacturing has attracted considerable attention because it significantly contributes to a sustainable supply chain where used parts/products can be recycled to reduce waste. Faced with the rise of the remanufacturing business, many original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) choose to authorize independent remanufacturers (IRs) for profit. In this paper, we consider a sustainable supply chain consisting of an OEM and an IR in a fuzzy environment where production cost and market demand are uncertain to study whether such an authorization decision would benefit both the economy and the environment. An unauthorized model (Nash game model) and two authorized models (Cooperative game and Stackelberg game models) are developed. Our results show that the cooperation between the OEM and the IR increases the selling price of the product, and therefore encourages authorization financially. However, a leader position of the OEM (i.e., in the Stackelberg game) helps achieve a win–win situation where profit maximization also improves the environment. Furthermore, our analysis illustrates that considering a fuzzy environment will boost the chances of authorization and help achieve a win–win situation.
3803-3850
Pan, Xiyue
d8b5bb43-6589-43e9-b8a1-199a97a4552c
Ge, Fangsheng
631f19cf-c813-4291-bea0-a41542fe36e9
Fang, Bowen
a518bf1d-3d32-4df6-8f87-8401c012cd69
Pan, Xiyue
d8b5bb43-6589-43e9-b8a1-199a97a4552c
Ge, Fangsheng
631f19cf-c813-4291-bea0-a41542fe36e9
Fang, Bowen
a518bf1d-3d32-4df6-8f87-8401c012cd69
Pan, Xiyue, Ge, Fangsheng and Fang, Bowen
(2026)
The economic and environmental effect of remanufacturing authorization in the fuzzy environment.
RAIRO - Operations Research, 59 (6), , [6].
(doi:10.1051/ro/2025072).
Abstract
Remanufacturing has attracted considerable attention because it significantly contributes to a sustainable supply chain where used parts/products can be recycled to reduce waste. Faced with the rise of the remanufacturing business, many original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) choose to authorize independent remanufacturers (IRs) for profit. In this paper, we consider a sustainable supply chain consisting of an OEM and an IR in a fuzzy environment where production cost and market demand are uncertain to study whether such an authorization decision would benefit both the economy and the environment. An unauthorized model (Nash game model) and two authorized models (Cooperative game and Stackelberg game models) are developed. Our results show that the cooperation between the OEM and the IR increases the selling price of the product, and therefore encourages authorization financially. However, a leader position of the OEM (i.e., in the Stackelberg game) helps achieve a win–win situation where profit maximization also improves the environment. Furthermore, our analysis illustrates that considering a fuzzy environment will boost the chances of authorization and help achieve a win–win situation.
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The_economic_and_environmental_effect_of_remanufacturing_authorization_in_the_fuzzy_environment
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Accepted/In Press date: 5 June 2025
e-pub ahead of print date: 7 January 2026
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 508973
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/508973
PURE UUID: a9509c0f-5283-4b57-a394-b22319389a1f
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Date deposited: 09 Feb 2026 17:42
Last modified: 14 Feb 2026 03:05
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Author:
Xiyue Pan
Author:
Bowen Fang
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