The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

The value of ex ante auditor disclosure: evidence from China

The value of ex ante auditor disclosure: evidence from China
The value of ex ante auditor disclosure: evidence from China
Purpose: this study examines whether and why ex ante disclosure of detailed auditor information influences investor decisions. Prior research focuses solely on ex post disclosure of auditor names, which is often embedded in annual reports, arrives too late, and conveys too little. China’s 2020 reform mandates pre-engagement disclosure of comprehensive auditor backgrounds, allowing us to test whether timely, granular disclosure reduces information acquisition costs and enables quality differentiation. The study shifts the audit disclosure debate from ex post verification to ex ante expectation formation, addressing when, what, and how auditor information matters.

Design/methodology/approach: using an event study approach, we first examine investor reactions to post-reform announcements containing auditor identity information. We then compare these reactions to pre-reform announcements without such disclosure to isolate the causal effect of ex ante auditor information. We further test how information acquisition costs moderate investors’ differentiation of auditor quality and examine the roles of analyst coverage and media attention.

Findings: ex ante disclosure of auditor identity elicits positive market reactions, moderated by information acquisition costs. Responses to high-quality auditors, especially audit partners, are strongest when directly disclosed, weaken with low-cost search, and vanish under high-cost inference. This cost gradient confirms information accessibility as the key mechanism. Analyst coverage and media attention amplify reactions by interpreting and disseminating information, thereby reducing investors’ processing costs.

Originality/value: this study contributes by identifying information acquisition costs as the key mechanism linking ex ante disclosure to investor decisions, a mechanism overlooked in ex post settings. It provides direct evidence on audit partners’ relative importance and offers regulatory insights showing that mandated pre-engagement disclosure of structured auditor backgrounds reduces information frictions and enables quality differentiation.
Keywords: ex ante disclosure of auditor information, market reaction, audit partner, auditor quality, information acquisition costs

0737-4607
Cao, June
af0d62ff-d54c-412f-a152-cc04c63c7290
Liu, Wenjun
1757320a-9c09-4358-b5b3-a50d5710774c
Zhang, Ran
2d9ccd1e-11b6-49fd-a24c-cccd1fab32a6
Cao, June
af0d62ff-d54c-412f-a152-cc04c63c7290
Liu, Wenjun
1757320a-9c09-4358-b5b3-a50d5710774c
Zhang, Ran
2d9ccd1e-11b6-49fd-a24c-cccd1fab32a6

Cao, June, Liu, Wenjun and Zhang, Ran (2026) The value of ex ante auditor disclosure: evidence from China. Journal of Accounting Literature.

Record type: Article

Abstract

Purpose: this study examines whether and why ex ante disclosure of detailed auditor information influences investor decisions. Prior research focuses solely on ex post disclosure of auditor names, which is often embedded in annual reports, arrives too late, and conveys too little. China’s 2020 reform mandates pre-engagement disclosure of comprehensive auditor backgrounds, allowing us to test whether timely, granular disclosure reduces information acquisition costs and enables quality differentiation. The study shifts the audit disclosure debate from ex post verification to ex ante expectation formation, addressing when, what, and how auditor information matters.

Design/methodology/approach: using an event study approach, we first examine investor reactions to post-reform announcements containing auditor identity information. We then compare these reactions to pre-reform announcements without such disclosure to isolate the causal effect of ex ante auditor information. We further test how information acquisition costs moderate investors’ differentiation of auditor quality and examine the roles of analyst coverage and media attention.

Findings: ex ante disclosure of auditor identity elicits positive market reactions, moderated by information acquisition costs. Responses to high-quality auditors, especially audit partners, are strongest when directly disclosed, weaken with low-cost search, and vanish under high-cost inference. This cost gradient confirms information accessibility as the key mechanism. Analyst coverage and media attention amplify reactions by interpreting and disseminating information, thereby reducing investors’ processing costs.

Originality/value: this study contributes by identifying information acquisition costs as the key mechanism linking ex ante disclosure to investor decisions, a mechanism overlooked in ex post settings. It provides direct evidence on audit partners’ relative importance and offers regulatory insights showing that mandated pre-engagement disclosure of structured auditor backgrounds reduces information frictions and enables quality differentiation.
Keywords: ex ante disclosure of auditor information, market reaction, audit partner, auditor quality, information acquisition costs

Text
Manuscript-RR1 - Accepted Manuscript
Download (104kB)

More information

Accepted/In Press date: 2026
e-pub ahead of print date: 26 February 2026

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 509873
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/509873
ISSN: 0737-4607
PURE UUID: 6acd2471-c4b9-4dbe-84f3-bcb5448fcee9
ORCID for June Cao: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-2981-4174

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 09 Mar 2026 17:59
Last modified: 10 Mar 2026 03:14

Export record

Contributors

Author: June Cao ORCID iD
Author: Wenjun Liu
Author: Ran Zhang

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×