Eliciting Expert Advice in Service-Oriented Computing
Eliciting Expert Advice in Service-Oriented Computing
We consider a setting where a consumer would like to elicit independent but costly reports from third-party experts about the reliability of a number of service providers. These reports can be of variable accuracy, but more accurate reports will be more costly to produce. The consumer can fuse reports from several experts to choose the provider with the highest probability of success. The goal in this paper is to find a mechanism which incentivises the experts to truthfully reveal the accuracy of the reports, and to induce the experts to invest costly resources in order to increase this accuracy. The challenge in doing so is that, while we can verify the success or failure of the selected service provider, we have no feedback about those service providers which were not selected. Moreover, we need to determine how to reward individual experts when the choice of service provider is based on a fused report from all exeperts. We explore a number of mechanisms to address this setting, including scoring rules, and indicate the problems in obtaining both truth telling and inducing the experts to produce accurate reports. We present a partial solution to this problem, and discuss remaining challenges.
29-43
Gerding, Enrico
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Larson, Kate
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Jennings, Nick
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
2010
Gerding, Enrico
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Larson, Kate
e180cd56-8fad-4e90-8e0c-00bd832ab254
Jennings, Nick
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Gerding, Enrico, Larson, Kate and Jennings, Nick
(2010)
Eliciting Expert Advice in Service-Oriented Computing.
In Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets, Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, Volumy 59.
Springer.
.
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
We consider a setting where a consumer would like to elicit independent but costly reports from third-party experts about the reliability of a number of service providers. These reports can be of variable accuracy, but more accurate reports will be more costly to produce. The consumer can fuse reports from several experts to choose the provider with the highest probability of success. The goal in this paper is to find a mechanism which incentivises the experts to truthfully reveal the accuracy of the reports, and to induce the experts to invest costly resources in order to increase this accuracy. The challenge in doing so is that, while we can verify the success or failure of the selected service provider, we have no feedback about those service providers which were not selected. Moreover, we need to determine how to reward individual experts when the choice of service provider is based on a fused report from all exeperts. We explore a number of mechanisms to address this setting, including scoring rules, and indicate the problems in obtaining both truth telling and inducing the experts to produce accurate reports. We present a partial solution to this problem, and discuss remaining challenges.
Text
amec09.pdf
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Published date: 2010
Additional Information:
Event Dates: May 12, 2009
Venue - Dates:
Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC 2009), Budapest, Hungary, 2009-05-12
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 267199
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/267199
PURE UUID: 2eacd7a4-0b98-46fe-9a96-3a665f29b6e8
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Date deposited: 19 Mar 2009 10:10
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 03:03
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Contributors
Author:
Enrico Gerding
Author:
Kate Larson
Author:
Nick Jennings
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