The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Eliciting Expert Advice in Service-Oriented Computing

Eliciting Expert Advice in Service-Oriented Computing
Eliciting Expert Advice in Service-Oriented Computing
We consider a setting where a consumer would like to elicit independent but costly reports from third-party experts about the reliability of a number of service providers. These reports can be of variable accuracy, but more accurate reports will be more costly to produce. The consumer can fuse reports from several experts to choose the provider with the highest probability of success. The goal in this paper is to find a mechanism which incentivises the experts to truthfully reveal the accuracy of the reports, and to induce the experts to invest costly resources in order to increase this accuracy. The challenge in doing so is that, while we can verify the success or failure of the selected service provider, we have no feedback about those service providers which were not selected. Moreover, we need to determine how to reward individual experts when the choice of service provider is based on a fused report from all exeperts. We explore a number of mechanisms to address this setting, including scoring rules, and indicate the problems in obtaining both truth telling and inducing the experts to produce accurate reports. We present a partial solution to this problem, and discuss remaining challenges.
29-43
Springer
Gerding, Enrico
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Larson, Kate
e180cd56-8fad-4e90-8e0c-00bd832ab254
Jennings, Nick
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Gerding, Enrico
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Larson, Kate
e180cd56-8fad-4e90-8e0c-00bd832ab254
Jennings, Nick
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30

Gerding, Enrico, Larson, Kate and Jennings, Nick (2010) Eliciting Expert Advice in Service-Oriented Computing. In Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets, Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, Volumy 59. Springer. pp. 29-43 .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

We consider a setting where a consumer would like to elicit independent but costly reports from third-party experts about the reliability of a number of service providers. These reports can be of variable accuracy, but more accurate reports will be more costly to produce. The consumer can fuse reports from several experts to choose the provider with the highest probability of success. The goal in this paper is to find a mechanism which incentivises the experts to truthfully reveal the accuracy of the reports, and to induce the experts to invest costly resources in order to increase this accuracy. The challenge in doing so is that, while we can verify the success or failure of the selected service provider, we have no feedback about those service providers which were not selected. Moreover, we need to determine how to reward individual experts when the choice of service provider is based on a fused report from all exeperts. We explore a number of mechanisms to address this setting, including scoring rules, and indicate the problems in obtaining both truth telling and inducing the experts to produce accurate reports. We present a partial solution to this problem, and discuss remaining challenges.

Text
amec09.pdf - Accepted Manuscript
Download (130kB)
Text
amec09.pdf - Other
Download (249kB)

More information

Published date: 2010
Additional Information: Event Dates: May 12, 2009
Venue - Dates: Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC 2009), Hungary, 2009-05-12
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 267199
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/267199
PURE UUID: 2eacd7a4-0b98-46fe-9a96-3a665f29b6e8
ORCID for Enrico Gerding: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-7200-552X

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 19 Mar 2009 10:10
Last modified: 26 Nov 2019 01:45

Export record

Contributors

Author: Enrico Gerding ORCID iD
Author: Kate Larson
Author: Nick Jennings

University divisions

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×