Vice-chancellor pay and performance: the moderating effect of vice-chancellor characteristics
Vice-chancellor pay and performance: the moderating effect of vice-chancellor characteristics
This article investigates the association between UK higher education institutions (HEIs) long- and short-term performance measures, and the pay of vice-chancellors/principals (VCs) in an era of intense neoliberalism/financialisation of HEIs, and consequently ascertains the extent to which the VC pay–performance nexus is moderated by VC characteristics. Using a longitudinal sample of UK HEIs, our baseline findings suggest that HEIs that prioritise meeting long-term social performance targets tend to pay their VCs low pay packages, whereas HEIs that focus on achieving short-term reputational performance targets pay their VCs high pay packages. We show further that the VC pay–performance relationship is moderated/explained largely by VC characteristics. Our findings are robust to controlling for alternative governance mechanisms, endogeneities, alternative performance measures and different estimation techniques. Our findings offer empirical support for optimal contracting and prestige theories with significant implications for the sector.
HEIs, UK, financialisation/neoliberalism, governance, performance, prestige theory, vice-chancellor/principal characteristics, vice-chancellor/principal pay
Elmagrhi, Mohamed H.
4961f329-8a2d-47c5-83ee-34fc058030fe
Ntim, Collins
1f344edc-8005-4e96-8972-d56c4dade46b
1 October 2022
Elmagrhi, Mohamed H.
4961f329-8a2d-47c5-83ee-34fc058030fe
Ntim, Collins
1f344edc-8005-4e96-8972-d56c4dade46b
Elmagrhi, Mohamed H. and Ntim, Collins
(2022)
Vice-chancellor pay and performance: the moderating effect of vice-chancellor characteristics.
Work, Employment and Society.
(doi:10.1177/09500170221111366).
Abstract
This article investigates the association between UK higher education institutions (HEIs) long- and short-term performance measures, and the pay of vice-chancellors/principals (VCs) in an era of intense neoliberalism/financialisation of HEIs, and consequently ascertains the extent to which the VC pay–performance nexus is moderated by VC characteristics. Using a longitudinal sample of UK HEIs, our baseline findings suggest that HEIs that prioritise meeting long-term social performance targets tend to pay their VCs low pay packages, whereas HEIs that focus on achieving short-term reputational performance targets pay their VCs high pay packages. We show further that the VC pay–performance relationship is moderated/explained largely by VC characteristics. Our findings are robust to controlling for alternative governance mechanisms, endogeneities, alternative performance measures and different estimation techniques. Our findings offer empirical support for optimal contracting and prestige theories with significant implications for the sector.
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Accepted_WES_Manuscript_9_June_2022
- Accepted Manuscript
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Accepted_WES_Online_Appendices_9_June_2022
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 9 June 2022
e-pub ahead of print date: 9 June 2022
Published date: 1 October 2022
Additional Information:
Funding Information:
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: We would like to acknowledge the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education (now part of Advance HE) (UK) for their generous support of this project through the Small Development Projects research funding stream.
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2022.
Keywords:
HEIs, UK, financialisation/neoliberalism, governance, performance, prestige theory, vice-chancellor/principal characteristics, vice-chancellor/principal pay
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 468138
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/468138
ISSN: 0950-0170
PURE UUID: 4a4214af-8ece-496c-9d99-119e08b82697
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Date deposited: 03 Aug 2022 16:47
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 02:27
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Author:
Mohamed H. Elmagrhi
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